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ABSTRACT 
We develop and test a new theory of share repurchases that emphasizes the importance of 
investors‘ heterogeneous expectations as a determinant of share repurchases. Optimistic 
shareholders (i.e. shareholders with higher expectations about future payoffs) want to pay cash to 
pessimistic shareholders, in exchange for the latter investors‘ shares. After tendering their shares, 
the pessimistic shareholders‘ opinions will not be reflected in the stock price due to short sale 
constraints, and thus, the stock price should increase following actual share repurchases. The 
theory predicts that a firm is more likely to announce and actually repurchase shares, when the 
divergence of investor opinion is high. The theory also predicts that managers intend to 
announce a larger fraction of target shares, when divergence of opinion is high.  Finally, the 
stock returns should be related positively to not only the actual shares repurchased, but also the 
divergence of investor opinion. In Essay I, We survey the literature of investor heterogeneity, 
specifically, investor divergence of opinion and build up the models in the framework of game 
theory; In Essay II, we provide evidence that investors‘ divergence of opinion is a determinant of 
share repurchase; In Essay III, we test the model with actual share repurchase data. Our 
empirical evidence supports the divergence of opinion theory and suggests that the divergence of 
opinion hypothesis has incremental explanatory power even after controlling for other 
repurchase hypotheses, such as the undervaluation-signaling hypothesis. 
  
iii 
 
DEDICATION 
This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Lie Li, and my family back in China. 
  
iv 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Ln(MV) Nature log of the market capitalization 
AT  Total asset 
Bmratio Fama and French (1993) book-to-market ratio 
Debtratio A ratio of long-term debt to total asset 
FixedAsset A ratio of fixed asset to total asset 
IntanAsset A ratio of intangible asset to total asset 
Psi  The residual of weekly return regressed on market and industry return 
Cash  Cash and cash equivalent  
FCF  Free cash flow 
OXD  Operation cost divided by sales 
R&D  Research & Development cost divided by sales 
PM  Profit margin (net income divided by sales) 
Return  Cumulative annual stock return 
Dividend Total dividends pay per share 
Abto_mean The mean of abnormal turnover 
Abto_median The median of abnormal turnover 
SUV_mean The mean of standardized unexplained volume 
SUV_median The median of standardized unexplained volume 
  
v 
 
ACKNOLEDGMENTS 
I express my deepest appreciate to my advisor, Dr. M. Mark Walker and my committee 
members, Drs. Kathleen Fuller, Fan Chen, and John Conlon. You have all contributed to my 
doctoral education in significant ways. I especially appreciate you all teaching me how to learn, 
how to think, and how to ask. 
I could not have financed my studies without the assistantship provided by the 
Department of Finance, The University of Mississippi.  
I would like to thank other professors: Robert Van Ness, Larry Cox, Andre Libenberg, 
Bonnie Van Ness, Walter Mayer, Mark Van Boening.  
Finally, I would like to thank my fellow finance doctoral students: Benjamin Blau, Mary 
Funk, Chip Wade, Jared Egginton. We have gone through some fun times together, as well as 
cruddy times, but you all were always there for me in various ways. Thank you!  
  
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ii 
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v 
LIST OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . .. . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .vi 
LIST OF TABLES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . .. . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii 
CHAPTER ONE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . .  . .. . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1 
CHAPTER TWO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . .  . .. . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . ..38 
CHAPTER TWO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . .  . .. . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . ..91 
REFERENCES . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . .  . .. . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . .126 
VITA. . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . .  . . . . . . .  . . . .  . .. . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . .136 
 
 
vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
1. CHAPTER TWO – Summary Statistics . . . . . . .  . . . .  . .. . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 61 
2. CHAPTER TWO – Logistic Regression on Share Repurchase Announcement . . . . . . .65 
3. CHAPTER TWO – Percentage of Shares Sought .  . .. . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ...69 
4. CHAPTER TWO – Percentage of Shares Sought – Divergence of Opinion. . . . . . . . .  74 
5. CHAPTER TWO – Correlation Coefficients for Repurchase Sample . . . . .  . . . . . . .. . 79 
6. CHAPTER TWO – Regression Analysis on Determinantst . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  .  81 
7. CHAPTER TWO – Actual Share Repurchase Sample Statistics . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . ..85 
8. CHAPTER TWO – Long-term Price Drift for NO-Actual Repurchase Firms. . . . . . . . .86 
9. CHAPTER TWO – Abnormal Return and Actual Share Repurchase. . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. ..87  
10. CHAPTER THREE – Definition of Variables . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  106 
11. CHAPTER THREE – Statistics of Net Share Repurchases. . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  110 
12. CHAPTER THREE – Repurchase Frequencies and Consecutively Repurchases. . ..  .112 
13. CHAPTER THREE – Firm Characteristics . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  .   114  
14. CHAPTER THREE – Difference of Divergence of Opinion . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  .117 
15. CHAPTER THREE – Actual Share Repurchase and Divergence of Opinion . . . . ..  . 119 
16. CHAPTER THREE – Changes in the firm pre- and post- Repurchase Programs .. ..  .120 
17. CHAPTER THREE – Changes of Divergence of Opinion . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  . 122 
 
viii 
 
LISTS OF FIGURES 
1. CHAPTER ONE – Divergence of Opinion and Share Repurchase . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
2. CHAPTER ONE – Stupid Investors‘ Strategies in Share Repurchase . . . .  . . . . . . . . . .27 
3. CHAPTER ONE – Smart Investors with Complete Information . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 30 
4. CHAPTER ONE – Smart Pessimistic Investors with In-Complete Information . . . .  . . 33 
5. CHAPTER ONE – Smart Optimistic Investors with In-Complete Information . . . .  . . .35 
6. CHAPTER TWO – Hypotheses and Empirical Findings. . . . . . . . . .. .. . . .. ... .. .. .. .. ..43  
7. CHAPTER TWO – Share Repurchase with Divergence of Opinion . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. . 47 
8. CHAPTER TWO – The Time Line of the Model. . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... .. .. 45  
 
  
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE:  
INVESTOR HETEROGENEITY IN BELIEFS AND ITS IMPACTS ON SHARE 
REPURCHASE: A SURVEY  
 
Introduction 
 In this essay, we survey the literature about investors having divergence of opinion on a 
stock's value, and motivate the hypotheses that we will develop and test in essays 2 and 3 of the 
dissertation. We review not only the major theoretical papers, but also the main lines of 
empirical research. The review includes a discussion of the measures of divergence of opinion 
used by previous research, and the rationale for each measure. Finally, we examine how 
divergence of opinion can affect a manager‘s decision to repurchase shares. Specifically, we 
examine the impact of actual share repurchases on the long-term stock price performance in the 
framework of investor divergence of opinion.  
 Previous researchers studying share repurchases generally assume homogeneous 
expectations. Theoretical models have been built on signaling theory, agency theory, optimal 
capital structure theory, and so forth. However, the tender offer premium puzzle and the long-
term stock price anomaly are left unexplained by existing models.
1
 Furthermore, the majority of 
existing empirical tests on these models focus on announcements of share repurchase, rather than 
actual share repurchases.  
                                                 
1
 With the tender offer premium puzzle, managers offer a tender price that is higher than the equilibrium stock 
price, defined as the stock price five days after a tender offer announcement. The long-term price anomaly refers 
to the long-term stock price performance following repurchase announcement. Empirical studies show that stock 
prices drift upwards, associated with persistent long-term abnormal returns, for about three years after open 
market share repurchase announcements. 
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In this dissertation, we initiate a model with investor heterogeneous expectations to 
explain the open market repurchases (repurchases, hereafter). We develop testable hypotheses, 
not only around announcements of share repurchase, but also on a manager‘s actual share 
repurchase activity. The results from essays 2 and 3 suggest that investors‘ divergence of opinion 
on the firm value matters in a manager‘s share repurchase decision. The larger the divergence of 
opinion, the more likely a manager announces share repurchases and the more shares he actually 
repurchases. The long-term stock price performance is consistent with the model predictions.   
The implication of the marginal-investor-theory with divergence of opinion, and the use 
of investors‘ belief dispersion measures have been adopted by previous researchers examining 
share repurchases. Bagwell (1991a), Bagwell (1991b), and Bagwell (1992) examine a unique 
dataset from Dutch Auction share repurchase, and find that shareholders are willing to sell their 
shares at dramatically different prices, implying an upward-sloping supply curve for equities. 
Persons (1997) suggests managers use tender offer repurchases to transfer wealth from 
shareholders who do not tender, to those who do. This transfer realizes a direct loss of firm 
capital, and is used as the cost of managers‘ signal that the firm is undervalued.  
Recently, the idea of divergence of opinion is introduced to explain open market share 
repurchases. Fried (2001) argues that the signaling theory in open market share repurchases is 
problematic, and managers announce open market repurchases because of opportunism. 
Managers take different actions after an announcement, depending on whether the stock is truly 
undervalued. Huang and Thakor (2010) build a simple model, where investors disagree with the 
managers about the firm‘s investment projects. Managers choose to repurchase shares in order to 
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change the investor base when the divergence of opinion between investors and managers is 
high. Conlon, Fuller and Wang (2011) and Blau et al. (2011) propose a model where investors 
disagree with one another. Managers repurchase shares from pessimistic shareholders and 
transfer wealth from those shareholders to optimistic shareholders, who are willing to stay in the 
firm and continue to provide their capital. They provide an explanation of long-term abnormal 
returns, following open market share repurchases.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the origins of 
divergence of opinion and its impact on equilibrium asset price, including the theoretical works 
and empirical studies. Section III surveys the literature on the measures of divergence of opinion 
and their rationales. Section IV discusses the implementation of the divergence of opinion in 
share repurchases. We also initiate several quantitative models in this section. Section V 
concludes the paper.  
 
II. Divergence of Opinion and Asset Equilibrium Price 
2.1 Definition of Divergence of Opinion  
Ever since Keynes (1937) and Williams (1956), economists have recognized the 
differences in investors‘ preferences and proposed the marginal-investor theory which 
emphasizes the importance of divergence of opinion in the functioning of capital markets. 
Divergence of opinion is often defined as a type of investor heterogeneity in financial 
economics, in which, investors‘ valuation of a signal asset diverge from each other because they 
hold different prior beliefs, or have different information process models.  
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People often share common information yet disagree as to the meaning of this 
information, not only in the evaluation of risky assets but also in the evaluation of economic 
policies, political candidates, and the result of tossing a dice. Another example is the differences 
among financial analysts‘ forecasts in response to a firm‘s earnings announcement. Investor 
heterogeneity can come from tax preference, risk tolerance, liquidity requirement, and private 
information. This branch of the literature concerns rational expectations asset pricing models. In 
this article, we focus on the heterogeneity originated from two other sources: the investors‘ prior 
beliefs and the model (often the likelihood function) that investors choose to process the public 
information. The asset pricing models in this second branch of the literature are usually referred 
to as irrational expectations models. 
 
2.2 Investor Homogeneity vs. Heterogeneity 
Despite these differences and despite strong and persuasive arguments put forward for 
including heterogeneity in finance and economics, the homogeneous representative agent 
paradigm is still the leading structural approach to asset pricing.
2
 Anderson, Ghysels and 
Juergens (2005) suggest that this happens for various reasons. First, in many contexts it is 
difficult to derive testable predictions in asset pricing models with heterogeneous agents. Second, 
even though some researchers have made progress recently (e.g. Constantinides and Duffie 
(1996), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Shefrin (2001), and Curcuru et al. (2004)), there is a lack of 
                                                 
2
 The same argument is presented in Browning, Hansen and Heckman (1999) and Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens 
(2005). 
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tangible data that represents heterogeneity. Third, and maybe most important, many of these 
formulations of heterogeneous agent models are observationally equivalent to representative 
agent models, as argued by Gorman (1953), Sharpe (1964), and Lintner (1965). Therefore, there 
is often no need to explicitly consider heterogeneous agents because there exists a representative 
agent, with a utility function of the same form as the agents.
3
  
 Some researchers disagree with Lintner (1965)‘s conclusions. Mayshar (1983) points out 
that the divergence of opinion not only exists, but is essential in determining asset prices. It is 
essential because of its association with endogenous limitations on the number of active market 
participants. The traditional models fail to recognize the fact that investors choose not only the 
size of their holdings in each asset, but also in which asset to invest. However, the models do 
agree that when short sale constraints are present, an asset pricing model with divergent opinions 
may differ from a model without divergent opinions. However, Mayshar (1983) continues to 
argue that, even without short sale constraints, investors endogenously choose to hold or not to 
hold an asset, which in fact constructs an uncompleted sub-market as if the short sale constraints 
exist.  
 
2.3 Rational v.s. Irrational Models 
                                                 
3
 For example, Lintner (1969) states that “Any carryover of … Ricardian notations of ‘marginal’ buyers setting prices 
in purely competitive markets is utterly unjustified and misleading when dealing with security markets under 
uncertainty. Every investors is a marginal holder with respect to his last share … of each security he holds”. Sharpe 
and Sharpe (1970) state that “in a somewhat superficial sense the equilibrium relationships derived for a world of 
complete agreement can be said to apply to a world in which there is disagreement, if certain values are 
considered to be averages”.   
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There are two major differences between the irrational asset pricing models and the 
rational ones. First, in the rational expectation models, trade is not generated by pubic 
information signals. Since all the investors share one utility function with the representative 
agent, all investors derive the same reservation value based on the public information. No trade 
is needed as the investors‘ portfolio is updated together with the market movements. In the 
irrational models of Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Grundy and McNichols (1989), trades are 
generated by the public information because traders disagree on its interpretation due to prior 
private information. We argue that the divergence of opinion is generated from different prior 
beliefs.   
Second, in the rational expectations models, disagreement is the result of private 
information. Investors who receive private information adjust their reservation value of an asset, 
and thus, adjust their portfolio holdings by buying or selling a certain amount of such assets. 
However, Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and Varian (1989) show that speculative trades based 
purely on differences in private information cannot occur among risk-averse traders in the 
absence of noise traders. No trade happens because uninformed traders observe the updated ask 
or bid price submitted by other traders and infer that the orders are submitted by informed 
traders, therefore, there is information risk to trade with them. With only risk averse investors 
present in the market, no one wants to trade with the other. Thus, rational expectation models 
usually rely on noise traders to generate the trades. When noise traders are present, uninformed 
traders are not able to distinguish whether the changes of asset price are due to private 
information, or noise orders.  
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2.4 Asset Pricing Models with Divergence of Opinion 
 Models with agents who have heterogeneous beliefs have been studied by Miller (1977), 
Harrison and Kreps (1978), Jarrow (1980), Mayshar (1983), Harris and Raviv (1993), Kandel 
and Pearson (1995), Van den Steen (2004), Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens (2005), Hong and 
Stein (2007), and Fama and French (2007). These models can be categorized into three groups: 
first, investors simply hold heterogeneous beliefs; second, investors generate heterogeneous 
beliefs on the same public information due to their different prior beliefs; and third, investors 
have different opinions about the same information because they interpret the information 
differently.  
 Early works, including Miller (1977), belong to the first category. Miller (1977) suggests 
a simple framework to analyze the asset prices with the investors‘ divergence of opinion. There 
are only two securities, one is the risk-free bond and the other is a risky stock. Miller (1977) 
shows that with the short sale constraints, asset prices tend to be higher than the average 
reservation value across all investors‘ expectation because pessimistic investors‘ opinions are not 
incorporated into security prices.  
 Jarrow (1980) and Mayshar (1983) extend Miller (1977)‘s model from one risky security 
into portfolio rebalancing with multiple risky assets. Jarrow (1980) suggests that stock prices will 
be overvalued when a short sale is not allowed, and investors hold homogeneous beliefs on the 
asset returns, but homogeneity of beliefs for the variance-covariance matrix of future asset 
returns.  With the same assumption, Mayshar (1983) find the same results. Furthermore, 
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Mayshar (1983) shows that investors endogenously choose to buy an asset and become active in 
a portion of the security market. With the heterogeneity of beliefs, the idiosyncratic risks are 
priced in equilibrium.  
  Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Van den Steen (2004) push this argument even further. 
Harrison and Kreps (1978) suggest that with the heterogeneity of beliefs, equilibrium asset prices 
could be even higher than the reservation value of the most optimistic investors. Speculative 
investors hold assets and expect to re-sell them to other investors in the future. Knowing that 
each investor may have a different reservation value, but not knowing the magnitude of the other 
investors‘ reservation value, speculative investors could offer to buy an asset at a price higher 
than their own reservation value. Van den Steen (2004) further shows that the over-optimism of 
those speculative investors is due to the biased self-attribution. Particularly, an agent tends to 
choose the action that she overestimates and then attributes the failure to exogenous factors.  
 Kandel and Pearson (1995)‘s model belongs to the second category, where investors‘ 
heterogeneity comes from different prior beliefs. They argue that the predictions from their 
model are consistent with the empirical findings about the patterns of trading volume. As in the 
models of Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Grundy and McNichols (1989), investors draw 
different conclusions from the same public information. More importantly, investors agree to 
disagree in equilibrium.  
 Harris and Raviv (1993) and Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens (2005) model the 
heterogeneity in the way that investors share common prior beliefs and receive common 
information but differ in the way in which they interpret this information. In Harris and Raviv 
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(1993), each investor updates their beliefs about the future returns using her own model of the 
relationship between the news and the asset‘s returns. The Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens 
(2005) model assumes that investors have the correct beliefs about the expected consumption 
growth, but incorrect beliefs about the higher moments of consumption growth. Therefore, when 
the mean beliefs differ from the true beliefs, the heterogeneity/bias matters. These two papers 
find that their models with heterogeneity are better in explaining trading volume – asset price 
changes relationship and in predicting return – volatility relationship, respectively.   
 Recently, Hong and Stein (2007) and Fama and French (2007) review the literature of 
investor heterogeneity in the way of divergence of opinion. Both studies emphasized the 
importance of the divergence of opinion in improve the traditional asset pricing models built on 
the assumption of investor homogeneity. Hong and Stein (2007) extend the short sale constraints 
into the ‗limits of arbitrage‘ and make the heterogeneous models a broader usage. They also 
argue that the limits of attention could also be a source of divergence of opinion. Fama and 
French (2007) argue that the assumptions for traditional asset pricing models, (i) there is 
complete agreement among investors about probability distributions of future payoffs on assets, 
and (ii) investors choose asset holdings based solely on anticipated payoffs, are unrealistic. Fama 
and French (2007) point out that the investors could disagree with each other due to their 
different tastes for assets as for consumption goods. They also suggest that with divergence of 
opinion, the uninformed investors hold the sub-optimal portfolio due the ‗limits of arbitrage‘ 
suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), in which the arbitrage is risky and risk averse informed 
investors do not fully offset the price effects of the misinformed.  
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 Overall, the theoretical works suggest that (i) the market equilibrium version of the 
divergence of opinion exists; (ii) the equilibrium asset prices in the market with heterogeneous 
investors differ from the ones in the market where investors are homogeneous; (iii) the 
predictions from asset pricing models with investor heterogeneity fit the pattern of trading 
volume, price changes, and return volatility better.  
 
2.5 Empirical Findings around Divergence of Opinion  
 In addition to the theoretical work, empirical evidences also support the existence of 
divergence of opinion and its impact on asset prices. The evidence comes from 1) event studies, 
such as corporate public announcements, analyst earnings forecasts, stock Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs), and share repurchases; 2) cross-sectional studies on equilibrium asset returns; 
and 3) the relationship among trading volume, price changes, and return volatilities.  
 Researchers have long noticed that investors respond differently to corporate public 
announcements, and that disagreement exists in analysts‘ earnings forecasts.4 Abarbanell, Lanen 
and Verrecchia (1995) suggest a relationship between analyst earnings forecast dispersions and 
the divergence of opinion among investors. They find that as a proxy of divergence of opinion, 
the dispersion of analyst forecasts can explain the volume reactions to earnings surprises. 
Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens (2005) confirm this relationship between the divergence of 
                                                 
4
 For example, the works include Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (1991), Abarbanell, Lanen and Verrecchia (1995), 
Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002), Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2006), Zhang (2006b), Zhang (2006a), Lerman, 
Livnat and Mendenhall (2007), Alexandridis, Antoniou and Petmezas (2007), Sadka and Scherbina (2007), and 
Barron, Stanford and Yu (2009). 
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opinion and the dispersion of analyst forecasts by examining the cross-sectional stock returns. 
They find that the dispersion of analyst forecasts is a priced factor in asset pricing models and 
has prediction power on the return volatility.  
 Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) test whether the dispersion of analyst forecasts is a 
proxy for divergence of opinion or risk. They find that their result is consistent with the 
argument that dispersion is a proxy for divergence of opinion rather than risk. Boehme, 
Danielsen and Sorescu (2006) use this proxy to test the Miller (1977)‘s hypothesis and find that 
with the presence of short sale constraints and divergence of opinion, stocks tend to be 
overvalued.  
 Ekholm (2006) examines how different types of investors react to new earnings 
information. With extremely detailed data from Finland market, he finds that large investors‘ 
trading behaviors differ from the majority of investors and tend to be the other side of trades in 
response to an earnings surprise. They argue that differences in trading behaviors are due to 
investors‘ overconfidence. Coval and Thakor (2005) suggest that the financial intermediaries 
work as a ‗beliefs-bridge‘ between optimists and pessimists.  
The empirical evidence of the existence of short sale constraints and the effects of 
divergence of opinion on asset equilibrium price has been documented. D‘avolio (2002), Duffie, 
Garleanu and Pedersen (2002), and Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002) study the security borrowing 
market and estimate the direct costs of borrowing securities for short sales. Margrabe (1978), 
Figlewski and Webb (1993), Ofek, Richardson and Whitelaw (2004), Evans et al. (2008), and 
Danielsen and Sorescu (2009) suggest that option market can be an substitution for mitigating 
12 
 
short sale constraints in completing a market. Jones and Lamont (2002), Chen and Singal (2003), 
Hong and Stein (2003), Nagel (2005), Haruvy and Noussair (2006), Danielsen and Sorescu 
(2009) examine the effects of divergence of opinion on asset prices with the presents of short 
sale constraints. Specifically, Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2006) directly test Miller 
(1977)‘s predictions and find that with present of short sale constraints and divergence of opinion 
simultaneously, the stock tend to be overvalued, as the price reflects the beliefs from the 
optimistic investors only.  
Recently, heterogeneous beliefs are also been adopt to explain the abnormal returns 
following the IPOs and the share repurchases. The studies include Chemmanur, Krishnan and 
Nandy (2009), Huang and Thakor (2010), and Blau et al. (2011). The authors argue that in the 
events of IPOs and share repurchases, the underwriters and managers try to attract the capital 
from the optimistic investors and therefore result in a higher price of firms‘ stocks. The direct 
evidence of investors‘ heterogeneity in their reservation value of an asset is also found by 
Bagwell (1992) from Dutch auction share repurchases.  
  
III. Measurement of Divergence of Opinion 
A direct measure of investors‘ beliefs is usually un-observable and the estimates are often 
difficult. Researchers in finance, accounting, and economics have to rely on certain observable 
proxies. The theoretical framework and the empirical implications in finding proper proxies for 
investors‘ beliefs have been developed from various research lines, including methodologies 
based on abnormal stock trading volume, analyst earnings forecast dispersion, stock bid-ask 
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spreads, and rating agency splits. We survey the methodology and the rationale of each of the 
measure in this section.   
3.1 Unexplained Volume based Proxies 
Prior research suggests that a component of trading volume may be attributed to opinion 
divergence. The rationale is that investors trade with each other when they interpret the public 
information differently, either because they have different prior beliefs or because they use 
different models to interpret the public information.  
Harrison and Kreps (1978) suggest that abnormal trading volume around corporate public 
announcements could be explained by the divergence of opinion among traders. Varian (1985) 
and Varian (1989) focus on the differences in prior beliefs as opposed to differences in models. 
Harris and Raviv (1993) show similar results when investors share the common public 
information and prior beliefs, but differ from each other in their information process models.  
Kandel and Pearson (1995) predict that volume will be increasing in the diversity of 
investor opinions around earnings events. They document that volume is higher around earnings 
events than during control periods with similar returns and no earnings news. They propose a 
theory to explain this finding, even in those cases in which earnings events elicit little or no price 
reaction. Their theory assumes that investors possess different likelihood functions and this 
causes them to interpret earnings news differently, consistent with Harris and Raviv (1993)‘s 
predictions. 
Similar to Kandel and Pearson (1995),  Kim and Verrecchia (1991) construct a model in 
which earnings announcements may increase information asymmetries because some market 
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participants process the announcement into private or informed judgments. In the context of their 
model, the authors show that greater diversity of opinions, caused by the differential processing 
of the information, leads to an increase in trading volume.  
These models differ in the way that the origins of the divergence of opinion, either from 
the different prior beliefs, or from different information process models, or both. Nevertheless, 
the conclusions are comparable—greater opinion divergence across investors is associated with 
more trading volume. 
Empirically, there is also support for using volume to proxy for differential opinions by 
traders. Studies analyzing total trading volume around earnings announcements include those of 
Bamber (1987), De Long et al. (1990), Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (1991), and Ajinkya et al. 
(2004). Generally, these studies find that volume is higher around earnings events that are more 
likely associated with more divergent investor opinions. Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006) look at 
the relationship between the divergence of opinion and trading volume after earnings 
announcement. They argue that the post-earnings announcement drift could be explained by the 
divergence of opinion among investors and the correlated price changes.  
Consistent evidence is also found from investors who trade on macroeconomic 
information releases. Fleming and Remolona (1999) find that trading volume increases 
significantly, while price volatility and spreads remain wide, as investors in Treasury securities 
trade to reconcile differential interpretations of macroeconomic information releases.  
Direct evidence is also recorded in the experimental literature, Smith, Suchanek and 
Williams (1988) show that even when traders observe identical probabilistic dividend 
15 
 
distributions, then trade occurs, sometimes in large volume. They conclude that there is diversity 
in opinions. 
The large trading volume could also be due to the different private information access 
across different types of investors. In the homogeneous expectation models, with the presence of 
noise traders, uninformed traders are unable to distinguish the trades from informed traders. 
Therefore, private information can also cause large trading volume. However, Brockman and 
Chung (2001) find that volume is increasing in the heterogeneity parameter on information event 
days, after controlling for the information effects of the announcements.  
Finally, we recommend a measure suggested by Hong and Stein (2007) and Garfinkel 
(2009). We measure the divergence of opinion among investors with the abnormal market 
adjusted turnover, ,i tAbto . To avoid the less-trading-frequency problem, we improve their 
method by using weekly cumulative trading volume rather than daily trading volume.
5
 The 
weekly market adjusted turnover, ,i tAbto , is the firm‘s weekly trading volume divided by its 
shares outstanding minus the ratio of market total trading volume, ,m tVol , scaled by market total 
shares outstanding, ,m tShrs , as in equation 3.1, where subscription i and m stands for the 
identification for each stock and the whole market.. We then measure the degree of divergence of 
opinion with the mean and median value of the weekly market adjusted turnover for each firm 
year. 
                                                 
5
 Some very illiquid stocks could have very small trading volume during some days in a year. The estimation from 
those extreme values can cause bias on our estimates of divergence of opinion.  
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A large proportion of this literature is focus on the relationship between trading volume 
and the absolute price changes, such as Harrison and Kreps (1978), Varian (1985), Varian 
(1989), De Long et al. (1990), and Kandel and Pearson (1995) among others. The results suggest 
that absolute price changes and volume are positively correlated, consecutive price changes 
exhibit negative serial correlation, and volume is positively auto-correlated. 
 We thus recommend the standardized unexplained stock trading volume, ,i tSUV  
(Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006) and Garfinkel (2009)) as an alternative measure of divergence of 
opinion.
 
Standardized unexplained stock trading volume measures the unexpected trading 
volume from the effect of both liquidity and information. Unexpected trading volume is the 
residual volume ( ,i t ) from a regression of the firm‘s weekly trading volume on weekly signed 
absolutely returns: 
 , , , ,i t i i i t i i t i tVolume Ret Ret   
 
    ,    (3.2) 
The plus and minus superscripts on the absolute valued returns indicate the sign of weekly returns. The 
standardized unexplained trading volume is the yearly average of such residuals scaled by the standard deviation 
of residual, as: 
 
,
52
,
1
,
52
i t
i t
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




       (3.3) 
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3.2 Analyst forecast based proxies 
 Unlike trading volume proxy for divergence of opinion, which is initiated by theoretical 
works and then supported by empirical evidences, analyst earnings forecasts dispersion proxy is 
concluded from empirical findings. The dispersion among analyst earnings forecasts can be 
looked as a natural experiment of the test on investor heterogeneity.  Analysts respond to the 
same corporate earnings announcement and make forecasts on the future earnings by each of 
them. Analysts often make different forecasts on future earnings.  
 Another difference between analyst forecasts dispersion proxy and trading volume proxy 
is that researchers usually do not distinguish whether the divergence of opinion among analysts 
is due to the different prior beliefs or different information process models. Lack of theoretical 
framework and testable data, it is difficult to distinguish the original sources of the divergence of 
opinion.  
 Supportive evidence from empirical findings is numerous. Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift 
(1991) formally test the link between the dispersion in financial analysts‘ earnings forecasts and 
the abnormal trading volume as a proxy of divergence of opinion, predicted by Varian (1985) 
and Karpoff (1986). Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (1991) show that the dispersion in analysts‘ 
earnings forecasts is positively related with the abnormal trading volume following the annual 
earnings announcements and is a proper proxy for agents‘ differing beliefs about the firm‘s 
prospects.  
 Abarbanell, Lanen and Verrecchia (1995) improve Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (1991)‘s 
measures by showing that, in a model of rational trade that incorporated earnings forecasts, 
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forecast dispersion along is insufficient to proxy for investor uncertainty. Other forecast 
properties, including the number of forecasts, the periods of the forecasts, and so forth also affect 
forecast dispersion. They describe an empirical methodology and show that with their method 
the dispersion-volume response coefficient is monotonically increasing after controlling for other 
effect, e.g. price changes.  
 Several researchers have adopted the dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts as a proxy 
for investors‘ divergence of opinion. For example, Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) and 
Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2006) use dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts as a proxy to test 
Miller (1977)‘s hypothesis; Zhang (2006a) and Zhang (2006b) examine how dispersion in 
analyst forecasts represents the information uncertainty and the cross-sectional relationship 
between forecast dispersion and the asset returns.  
 Lerman, Livnat and Mendenhall (2007) and Alexandridis, Antoniou and Petmezas (2007) 
also adopt this methodology to examine the asset pricing anomalies. While Lerman, Livnat and 
Mendenhall (2007) focus on post-earnings announcement drift and Alexandridis, Antoniou and 
Petmezas (2007) highlight the importance of divergence of opinion in explaining the post-
acquisition performance, both studies suggest dispersion in analyst forecasts is a good proxy for 
investors‘ divergence of opinion.  Recently, Sadka and Scherbina (2007) and Barron, Stanford 
and Yu (2009) also choose this proxy to test the relationship between divergence of opinion, 
asset liquidity, and asset prices.  
We recommend the two measures suggested by Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002). 
The first proxy is the standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts divided by the mean of the 
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analysts‘ forecasts, ,_ i tDisp mean , (see Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002)). For each month, 
we compute the monthly divergence of opinion for a firm by using the annual fiscal year 
earnings estimate for that month. We then estimate the average yearly divergence of opinion (
,_ i tDisp mean ) as the mean of the monthly divergence of opinion in any given year. 
,
,
,
( )
_ ;
( )
i t
i t
i t
Std forecast
Disp mean
Mean forecast
       (3.4) 
Since the mean of analyst earnings forecast could be zero, and infinite analyst dispersion 
could be problematic, we choose an alternative measure ,_ i tDisp price , which we define as the 
standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts scaled by stock price. Our model suggests that it 
is the difference in valuations between optimistic and pessimistic investors that matter. Thus, our 
second proxy for the divergence of opinion is the difference between the highest earnings 
forecast and the lowest one, scaled by the absolute value of the mean earnings forecast.  
,
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       (3.5) 
3.3 Bid-ask Spreads  
In the literature of market microstructure, bid-ask spread has been suggested as a proxy 
for divergence of opinion. For example, Houge et al. (2001) use the opening bid-ask spread as a 
proxy of divergence of opinion of investors to test Miller (1977)‘s hypothesis on IPOs. The 
authors argue that the bid-ask spread can be decomposed into three components, the order 
processing, adverse selection, and inventory costs. Among them, adverse selection components 
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reflect the dispersion between investors‘ opinions. The same methodology has also been adopted 
by Handa, Schwartz and Tiwari (2003).  
However, the adverse selection component proposed by Amihud and Mendelson (1980) 
and Ho and Stoll (1983) represent the different evaluation caused by different private 
information. Uninformed market makers face adverse selection costs when they trade with 
informed traders. This type of divergence of opinion is not belongs to the scope of our definition 
of divergence of opinion. We therefore do not recommend use the adverse selection components 
of bid-ask spread as a proxy for divergence of opinion.  
 
3.4 Agency Rating Splits 
Morgan (2002) use the splits among agency ratings as a measure of dispersion of 
valuations among rating agencies. However, he does not model and test whether the splits among 
agencies are due to the different private information or due to the divergence of opinion defined 
in this essay. The purpose of his study is to test whether the splits of agency ratings represent the 
difficulty level for outside investors to understand and predict the firm‘s prospects. Flannery, 
Kwan and Nimalendran (2004) re-examine this issue with a more widely accepted proxy of 
divergence of opinion, the dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts, and find the contradict result. 
Furthermore, the agency rating data is often not publicly available. Morgan (2002) collects the 
data by hand. We do not use this measure in our study due to the contradictory results obtained 
by previous researches and the difficulty of collecting the data.  
 
IV. Investor Heterogeneity and Share Repurchase 
4.1 The Existing Literature of investor heterogeneity and share repurchases 
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Bagwell (1991a) first initiates the argument of the implementation of investor 
heterogeneity in the context of tender offer share repurchase. However, Bagwell (1991a) shows 
that managers can use share repurchase as a takeover deterrent when the supply curve for shares 
is upward-sloping. The upward-sloping supply curve represents the divergence of opinion among 
shareholders in evaluation the firm‘s value. Managers can push up stock price with share 
repurchases, because shareholders willing to tender in the repurchases are systematically those 
with the lowest valuations. The repurchases skew the distribution of remaining shareholders 
toward a more expensive pool. The result holds even the capital gains taxation is considered.  
Bagwell (1991b) and Bagwell (1992) provide supportive evidence of investor‘s 
heterogeneity in stock valuation to his upward-sloping supply curve argument.  By examining 
Dutch auction share repurchases, Bagwell documents that the supply curves of shares are clearly 
upward-sloping. The shareholders‘ valuations on the firm differ dramatically. He argues that the 
―the hypothesis of common valuations indeed is not always a good approximation‖.6 
Although Bagwell does not examine why shareholders are heterogeneous in their 
valuations, his evidence does support the hypothesis that shareholders respond differently to a 
single corporate announcement.  
Persons (1997) builds a model with investor heterogeneity to explain the tender offer 
premium puzzle. He also argues that managers transfer wealth from shareholders who do NOT 
tender to who do. Such wealth transferring is costly for the managers, and therefore, prevents the 
                                                 
6
 Bagwell (1991b), “Shareholder Heterogeneity: Evidence and Implications,” American Economic Review, Vol 81, 
pp218.  
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low-performance firms from mimicking their signals. However, in his model, the investor 
heterogeneity comes from information asymmetry, rather than different prior beliefs or 
information process models as defined in this essay. 
Huang and Thakor (2010) inherent the idea from Dittmar and Thakor (2007) but use it 
inversely in share repurchase rather than issuance.  Huang and Thakor (2010) look at the open 
market repurchases. They argue that managers could have different evaluations on their firm‘s 
value from outside investors. More importantly, they point out that such differences could come 
from divergence of opinion rather than information asymmetry.  The divergence of opinion could 
due to the fact that different generations have heterogeneous prior beliefs about the probability of 
the firm‘s future investment opportunities. Although they do not specifically model the 
differences in prior beliefs, they provide empirical evidence suggesting that divergence of 
opinion, proxied by dispersion in analyst forecasts and the structure of institutional holdings is an 
important factor which affects the managers‘ share repurchasing decisions.  
 
V. Divergence of opinion and Actual Share Repurchase 
5.1 A simple introduction of the idea 
We introduce share repurchases when investors have divergent opinions by considering a 
simple model.  The purpose of the model is to show that stock price will increase following 
managers‘ actual share repurchases.  
The model is built on the framework of Miller (1977). Figure 1 shows the demand curves 
of shares when investors have divergent opinions on the firm‘s value. The curve AO, BO, and 
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CO are three different demand curves (similar to the upward sloping ‗supply‘ curve in Bagwell 
(1991b)). The curve AO represents a demand curve of shares in a firm with the highest investor 
divergence of opinion on the firm value and CO represents a demand curve without the investor 
divergence of opinion. N is the number of shares outstanding. It also represents the supply curve 
of shares. The model includes short sale constraints. 
In equilibrium, the stock prices will be at PA, PB, and PC, for each demand curve, 
respectively.  Consistent with Miller (1977), PA > PB > PC suggests that firms with high 
divergence of opinion among investors are likely to be overvalued.  
Figure 1 Divergence of opinion and share repurchase 
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When managers repurchase shares, the supply curve shifts to the left from N to N‘. One 
can see that the equilibrium prices move up to PA‘, PB ‘, and PC‘, respectively. From the graph, 
one can directly observe that, PA‘-PA > PB ‘-PB > PC‘-PC=0. We conclude that: (i) without 
divergence of opinion, the stock price will not change when managers repurchase shares; and (ii) 
the larger the divergence of opinion, the more the stock price will increase when managers 
repurchase the same amount of shares. We derive testable hypotheses in essay 2 and 3 based on 
these two conclusions.  
 
5.2 Key assumptions of the model 
Assumption 1: Investors are heterogeneous either in their prior beliefs, or in their information 
processing models (the likelihood models). 
This assumption allows investors to respond differently to a public announcement made 
by the firm‘s managers. However, the assumption does not require that investors hold different 
private information. Investors know that they are heterogeneous in their opinions about the 
firm‘s value, but they agree to disagree with each other. The objective function for each investor 
is to maximize the payoff. They make decisions on their own beliefs.  
Assumption 2: Short sales are allowed but constraints exist.  
This assumption suggests that shareholders, who tender their shares, as a whole, are not 
able to short sale all their previous portfolios after tendering. The short sale constraints could be 
the result of the high stock-borrowing costs, the trading policy constraints, or the ‗limits-of-
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arbitrage‘ due to risks in arbitraging for risk-averse investors. Similar to the divergence of 
opinion, short sale constraints are also the common knowledge for all investors and the manager.  
Assumption 3: the share repurchases do not distort the firm‘s investment portfolio.  
With this assumption, the true future value of the firm does not change due to share 
repurchases. This assumption also implies that share repurchases do not contain information 
about future earnings.  
 
5.3 A simple numerical example with ‘stupid-investors’   
We first provide a simple model where investors have different beliefs on a firm‘s value, 
but they do NOT update their beliefs even they observe the manager‘s repurchase announcement 
and the changes in price after the announcement.  
For simplicity, we assume there are three shareholders and one manager in the firm. Each 
of them holds one share. Let the ‗true‘ value of the firm at liquidation be $48. If all shareholders 
keep their shares to the last period of liquidation, each of them will equally acquire one-fourth of 
the firm‘s wealth, $12.  
With the divergent opinions, each of investor (including shareholders and the manager) 
has his own expectation on the firm‘s future value. Shareholder 1 (SH1) believes each share will 
be worth $10, $11 for shareholder 2 (SH2), and $13 for shareholder 3 (SH3). The manager, by 
chance, holds the belief of $12 each share.  
With short sale constraints, the stock is traded at $10 per share, which is determined by 
the most pessimistic shareholder‘s opinion, according to the marginal-investor-theory. From the 
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point of the manager‘s view, the stock is undervalued, since the manager believes that the stock 
is worth $12. If all shareholders and the manager choose to hold the shares until the last period, 
the expected payoffs for each of them are: SH1:10, SH2:11, M:12, and SH3:13.   
We will show that the manager can increase his payoff by repurchasing shares. The 
manager will continue to repurchase shares until the stock price equals his valuation. 
Shareholders choose to accept or reject the manager‘s repurchasing offers by comparing the 
offering prices and the belief of each of them.  
The game tree is presented in figure 2. There are 5 nodes in the game. At each node, the 
round circle represents the manager‘s decision, while the square circle represents the 
shareholders‘ choice. M, SH1, SH2, and SH3 stand for the manager, and other three 
shareholders. The final payoffs for each of them are also labeled in the game for each investor.  
The manager‘s strategy set is {stop, offer}. S0, S2, and S4 are the manager‘s strategy at node 0, 
2, and 4 to stop repurchase shares. $10.9 and $11.9 are the tendering prices if the manager 
chooses the offer strategy at node 0 and node 2. Shareholders‘ strategy set is {accept, reject}. A1 
and A2 represent that the shareholder accept the manager‘s offer at node 1 and node 3, 
respectively.
7
  
 
 
 
Figure 2 ‗Stupid‘ investors‘ strategies in share repurchase 
                                                 
7
 We do not label the shareholders’ reject strategy in the game. If a shareholder does not accept the manager’s 
offer, he automatically chooses the reject strategy.  
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At node 1, the initial point, the manager has two strategies: (1) to repurchase at least one 
share or (2) not to repurchase any share. If the manager chooses not to repurchase any share, the 
game is over and the expected payoffs for each of investors do not change. If the manager 
chooses to repurchase at least one share, he offers a tender price, $10.9, which is slightly higher 
than current stock price, to buy shares from other shareholders.  
At node 2, all shareholders observe the tender price and choose their own strategy, to 
accept the offer or reject the offer, by comparing the expected payoff from each of these two 
strategies. With a $10.9 offering price, only shareholder 1 is willing to tender his share, since his 
payoff from tendering, 10.9, is higher than his expected payoff, 10, from holding his share. Other 
shareholders choose to reject the offer, since tendering shares will reduce their payoffs.  
After shareholder 1 tendering his share, the manager re-calculates the value (his expected 
payoffs) for each of the remaining shares, (12*4-10.9)/3=12.37. The shareholder 2 and 3 re-
calculate the expected payoffs too, based on their own evaluation on the firm value. After 
shareholder 1 tendering, the expected payoffs for each of the investors are: S1:10.9, S2:11.03, 
M:12.37, and S3:13.7. The stock price is updated to $10.9-11.03, determined by the manager‘s 
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repurchasing price (bid price) and the opinion of shareholder 2 (ask price), who is not the most 
pessimistic shareholder.  
At node 3, the manager again has two strategies: to repurchase more shares or to stop 
repurchase. He compares the current stock price with his own evaluation, and concludes that the 
stock is still undervalued. The manager thus chooses to repurchase more shares and offer $11.9, 
a price slightly higher than current stock price.  
At node 4, remaining shareholders observe the manager‘s second offer, and choose to 
reject this offer or to accept it. Only shareholder 2 chooses to accept this offer and tender his 
share, since his expected payoff from tendering 11.9 is higher than 11 from holding his share. 
Shareholder 3 chooses to reject this offer. Aft shareholder 2 tenders his share, the manager re-
calculates his expected payoff again, and the value is 12.6.  
At node 5, the manager still has two strategies to choose: to repurchase or to stop. Since 
the stock price is now $11.9, which (almost) equals to the opinion of the manager himself. The 
manager will not repurchase any more shares and choose to stop. Without any more repurchases, 
the payoff for the manager and the shareholder 3‘s payoff are: M:12.6 and S3:14.6. The game is 
over. 
 The equilibrium of this game is: the manager will offer twice and repurchase two shares 
from shareholder 1 and shareholder 2, respectively. The manager first offers $10.9, and 
shareholder 1 accepts the offer. The manager then offers $11.9 and shareholder 2 accepts the 
offer. The manager then chooses to stop and the game is over. The payoffs for each of them are: 
S1:10.9, S2:11.9, M:12.6, and S3:14.6. 
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 At each period of this game, trade occurs as it increases the payoff for each player. Stock 
price goes up following the investors‘ expectation schedule, when the manager repurchases 
shares. The manager stops repurchase, when the stock price equals to his belief and he cannot 
increase his payoff through repurchases.  
 
5.4 A ‘smart’ investor with complete information  
 In the above ‗stupid-investors‘ model, investors do not respond to the information in the 
manager‘s repurchasing announcement. They choose their strategy, at each step, based upon only 
the current repurchasing information (offering price) and their own evaluation.  
We now analyze a model where investors choose their strategy based upon the 
information from the whole game. We further assume that all investors share the full information 
of the game. Both shareholders and the manager know the whole structure of the game, namely 
the prices that the manager will offer at each step and the step where the manager will stop offer 
further repurchases.   
 To simplify the discussion, we consider the game where only one shareholder and the 
manager hold one share of the firm asset for each of them. The shareholder believes the firm is 
worth $10 per share and the manager‘s belief is $12 per share. The game is played as below in 
figure 3.  
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Figure 3 Smart Investor with completed information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This game tree has 5 nodes. At each node, the round circle represents the manager‘s 
decision and the square circle represents the shareholders‘ choice. M stands for the manager, 
while SH stands for the shareholder. $10.9 and $11.9 are the manager‘s offering prices. S1, S3, 
and S5 represent that the manager choose to stop repurchase at each node, respectively.  A2, A4, 
R2, and R4 represent the shareholder‘s strategy at each node, to accept the offer or to reject the 
offer. The payoffs for the shareholder and the manager at each step are labeled in the figure.  
  We solve this game with backward induction. At the last period, node 5, the manager has 
two strategies to choose: (1) continue to offering at a price higher than 12, or (2) stop the 
offering. If the manager choose to offer at a higher price, for example 12.1, his pay off will be 
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this offer, his expected payoff will be 10, since he knows that the manager will stop offer at next 
step. Therefore, the shareholder will choose to accept the manager‘s offer, 11.9, at this step.  
At the node 3, the manager knows that if the manager extends the offer at $11.9, the 
shareholder will choose to accept the offer at his turn rather than reject it. The manager also 
knows that when the shareholder accepts the offer, his expected payoff will be 12.1. At the node 
3, the other strategy that the manager can choose is to stop offering. If the manager choose to 
stop offering, he know that his expected payoff will be 12, which is less than the payoff he can 
get if he offer to repurchase at $11.9. Therefore, manager will choose to offer at the price $11.9 
at node 3.  
Back to node 2, the shareholder has choices between reject the offer at $10.9 or accept 
this offer. Since the shareholder knows the whole structure of the game, he knows that manager 
will offer at $11.9, if he rejects this offer of $10.9. He also knows that he can accept the offer at 
next step with a payoff 11.9, which is higher than the payoff 10.9 from accept the current offer. 
He thus chooses to reject the offer at $10.9 and expects the manager to offer at $11.9.  
 Back to the node 1, the original node, the manager knows the shareholder will reject his 
offer at $10.9 and wait for the offer at $11.9. However, if the manager chooses not to offer at 
very beginning, his expected payoff is only 12. Comparing the payoff he can get from offering to 
the last step, 12.1, the manager will choose to offer to repurchase shares. The game is solved.  
 There exists an equilibrium, in which the payoffs for the shareholder and the manager are 
(11.9, 12.1). The shareholder will reject all the manager‘s offers but the last one. The manager 
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will choose to repurchase shares with a higher offering price until the last step, where the 
offering price (almost) equals to the manager‘s evaluation.  
 In this ‗smart-investor‘, complete information game, shareholders will choose to hold 
their shares right before the manager stop offering, regardless of their own expectation. The trade 
will not occur until the manager‘s last offer. All shareholders, whose evaluations are lower than 
the manager‘s, will accept the manager‘s last offer. Other shareholders, whose evaluations are 
higher than (or equal to) the manager‘s, will reject all the manager‘s offerings. The payoffs for 
all shareholders and the manager increase when trade occurs.   
 
5.5 A pessimistic ‘smart’ investor with in-complete information 
At the initial state of the nature, a manager and a shareholder hold each share of a 
company. There are two states in the game, where the nature decides which state applies. In the 
state with good economy, the shareholder and the manager hold beliefs, $10 and $12, for value 
of each share. In the state with bad economy, the shareholder and the manager hold beliefs, $10 
and $11, for value of each share. The possibility of the good economy is 0.2, and 0.8 for the bad 
economy.  
Both the manager and the shareholder do not have the knowledge that which state of 
nature applies. The shareholder neither has the knowledge of the manager‘s belief, but he can 
observe the current offering price.  The game tree is presented in Figure 4 and all symbols are 
same as the ones in Figure 3. 
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Figure 4 Smart pessimistic investors with in-complete information  
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between accept the offer or reject it.  
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from the next offer, 11.9, will be higher than the one from the current offer 10.9. After the 
shareholder rejects the manager‘s first offer at node 2, he expects the manager‘s second offer.  
At node 3, the manager chooses to continue to offer repurchase, since the payoff from 
repurchase 12.1 is higher than 12 from stop repurchase.  
At node 4, the shareholder will accept the manager‘s offer at $11.9, and his gain will be 
1.9 (11.9-10). With the probability of 0.2 of the good economy, his expected gain is 
1.9*0.2=0.38. 
Back to node 2, if the shareholder believes that the current state is in the bad economy 
and the manager‘s reservation value is $11, he chooses to accept the offer and tender his share at 
node 2 with price $10.9, because he believes there is no further offer. With the probability of 0.8 
of the bad economy, his expected gain is 0.72=0.9*0.8=(10.9-10)*0.8 .  
If the shareholder misunderstands the economy and accepts the first offer 10.9 in a good 
economy, he still has expected gain 0.18=0.9*0.2=(10.9-10)*0.2. Therefore, his total expected 
gain from accepting the first offer 10.9 is 0.9=0.72+0.18.  
In equilibrium, with the belief structure of the investor on the manager‘s reservation 
value, (11:0.8, 12:0.2), the shareholder will always choose to accept the manager‘s first offer, 
since the expected payoff 0.9 is higher than 0.38 from other strategy. The payoffs for the 
shareholder and the manager are (10.9, 13.1).  
 
5.6 An optimistic ‘smart’ investor with in-complete information 
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Now, let us consider another situation, where another shareholder holds the same prior 
belief about the company, but she react differently to the manager‘s repurchase offering. Assume 
the second shareholder is more optimistic and her belief structure on the manager‘s reservation 
value is (11:0.5, 12:0.5). The game has no changes, but the shareholder‘s expected gains change.  
 
 
Figure 5 Smart optimistic investors with in-complete information  
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If the second shareholder accepts the offer at node 2, her total expected gain is 0.9. If she 
rejects the manager‘s offer at node 2, and is be able to get the offer at node 4 in the good 
economy, her expected gain is 1.9*0.5=0.95. Obviously, as an optimistic shareholder, the second 
shareholder will choose to reject the first offer and to wait the manager‘s second offer.  
The manager, after seeing the shareholder rejects his $10.9 offer, has two strategies: one, 
to continue the second offer at $11.9, or two, to stop offering. The manager knows that, if he 
offers at $11.9 and the shareholder accepts the offer, his payoff will be 12.1. If the manager stop 
offering, his payoff is 12. The manager thus chooses to offer at $11.9.  The payoffs for this 
shareholder and the manager are (11.9, 12.1), when the manager offers the second repurchase.  
In equilibrium, with the belief structure of the investor on the manager‘s reservation 
value, (11:0.5, 12:0.5), the shareholder will always choose to reject the manager‘s first offer and 
accept the manager‘s second offer. The manager will also continue to offer until the offering 
price (almost) equals his reservation value. The payoffs for the shareholder and the manager are 
(11.9, 12.1).  
  
VI Conclusion 
 In this paper, we briefly survey the literature of the investor heterogeneity, specifically, 
investor divergence of opinion. The purpose of this survey is to build a deep and broad 
understanding of investor divergence of opinion. We then initiate a model based on investor 
divergence of opinion in order to explain managers‘ motivation of share repurchase and related 
asset pricing anomalies. 
37 
 
We review the theories on investor divergence of opinion. Investors can have differing 
opinions of a single firm, even without information asymmetry. Most theoretical studies suggest 
that investors draw different opinions due to two reasons: first, investors have different prior 
beliefs and second, investors have the same prior beliefs, but different information process 
models. Recently, Fama and French (2007) argue that investors can have different taste on one 
asset, and therefore, have different utility functions on the same payoff.  
Empirical evidence generally supports the existence of investor divergence of opinion 
and its impact on asset prices. Bagwell (1991b) and Bagwell (1992) document direct evidence of 
investor heterogeneity from Dutch Auction repurchases. The evidence of Miller (1977)‘s over-
valuation hypothesis has also been found, suggesting that investor divergence of opinion has an 
impact on equilibrium asset prices.  
We apply Miller (1977)‘s theory, and initiate a model of open share repurchases. Our 
model suggests that managers repurchase shares due to divergence of opinion. Managers believe 
pessimistic shareholders undervalue the stock, and thus repurchase shares from them. Stock 
prices increase as managers repurchase shares. Wealth is transferred from tendering shareholders 
to non-tendering shareholders when manager repurchase shares, only if those managers are not 
too optimistic and purchase shares at a price higher than the intrinsic value.   
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CHAPTER TWO:  
INVESTOR HETEROGENEITY IN BELIEFS AND ITS IMPACTS ON SHARE 
REPURCHASE: A SURVEY  
 
 
Recently, the popularity of share repurchases by firms has drawn a lot attention and raises 
an important question: Why do firms repurchase shares?
8
 Although researchers have proposed 
several hypotheses, there are discrepancies between the theoretical work and the empirical 
findings. The goal of our paper is to develop a new theory of share repurchase, which is 
consistent with the results of previous empirical studies, and to test the importance of investors‘ 
expectation in the manager‘s decision to repurchase shares.   
This paper provides an alternative theory of share repurchases that is consistent with the 
results of previous empirical studies. The theory builds on the idea that managers‘ share 
repurchase decision depends on their valuations, and the investors‘ valuations of the firm. With 
different priors, investors could have separate expectations on the firm‘s future cash flows, 
although they share the common information about the firm‘s investment portfolio. Optimistic 
shareholders, who have higher expectation on future cash flows and believe that current stock 
price is undervalued, would rather pay a premium to pessimistic shareholders for their shares and 
acquire more rights on future cash flows. Pessimistic shareholders are willing to tender their 
shares, if the repurchasing price is higher than their valuations. With short sales constraints, 
those pessimistic shareholders will not be able to build up short positions after tendering. As 
suggested by Miller (1977), stock price stays high when those pessimistic opinions are not 
                                                 
8
 Although U.S. corporations chose to pay out cash in the form of dividends rather than share repurchases in the 
past decades, Grullon and Michaely (2002) report that the expenditure on share repurchases relative to earnings 
expanded almost 10 times through 1980 to 2000. 
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reflected in the price.
9
 The magnitude of the price increase is dependent upon both the degree of 
divergence of opinion and the quantity of shares actually repurchased. The larger the divergence 
of opinion, managers will repurchase more shares and the stock prices increase following those 
actual repurchases. From the optimistic investors‘ point of view, the stock was indeed 
undervalued. However, such undervaluation is not necessarily due to the information asymmetry, 
but simply the different opinions. It is the heterogeneous expectation that generates 
‗undervaluation‘. 
Managers could choose share repurchase regardless of the presence of agency problem, if 
only the divergence of opinion is large. If managers work for the best interests of shareholders, 
they could repurchase shares as long as the expenditure on share repurchase does not affect the 
real investment decision. Share repurchases increase the utility for both pessimistic and 
optimistic shareholders. When agency problem emerge, managers might over-repurchase shares 
and push up stock price in short run. As in Jensen (1986), they would have to skip good 
investment opportunities due to the lack of cash in the future.  In both cases however, managers 
benefit from the increases in stock price through options and stock compensation.
10
  
It seems that managers can always artificially push up the price through share 
repurchases, but there are constraints that limit managers. First, managers must have ‗excess free 
cash‘ in hand in order to keep the repurchasing cost at a minimum. Without good investment 
opportunities, holding excess cash earns only returns at risk free rates, while the cost of 
                                                 
9
 The evidence of Miller (1977) theory has been documented by Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002), Chen, Hong 
and Stein (2002), Chang, Cheng and Yu (2007), and Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2009). 
10
 See Vermaelen (1984), Lambert, Lanen and Larcker (1989) and Fenn and Liang (2001) for more comprehensive 
discussion on the management incentive to share repurchases.  
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borrowed cash could be too high to finance a repurchasing program. Second, managers will have 
to pay the optimistic shareholders higher returns for the additional idiosyncratic risks from extra 
stake holdings. With heterogeneous expectations and short sale constraints, idiosyncratic risks 
cannot be fully diversified, and thus, are priced.
11
 Empirically, Babenko (2009) finds that 
managers and employees are forced to bear more firm-specific risk after share repurchases. 
These two constraints predict that large, low growth firms, which usually have more excess cash 
and lower idiosyncratic risks, are more likely to repurchase shares. This prediction is consistent 
with the empirical evidence that abnormal returns are concentrated in ‗value‘ rather than 
‗glamour‘ stocks.  
We find empirical evidence that supports the investor heterogeneous expectation model. 
The higher the divergence of opinion among investors, the more likely a firm is to repurchase its 
shares, announce larger target shares, and actually repurchase more shares. Such results hold, 
even after controlling other factors, such as the signaling and agency hypotheses. Finally, we 
find that firms earn long-term excess returns only when they actually repurchase shares. A 
portfolio that consists of no-actual-repurchasing firms earns no abnormal returns following 
repurchase announcements. Overall, our empirical evidence supports the divergence of opinion 
hypothesis as an alternative explanation for share repurchases, even after controlling for other 
hypotheses such as the undervaluation-signaling hypothesis. 
                                                 
11
 Theoretical works can be found in Mayshar (1983), Constantinides and Duffie (1996), and Fama and French 
(2007); while empirical evidence are documented by Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) and Storesletten, Telmer and 
Yaron (2007).  
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Our paper is closely related to Dittmar and Thakor (2007), who build a heterogeneous 
expectation model to explain the management choice between issuing debt or equity when 
financing an investment. They find that managers issue debt rather than equity when the markets 
disagree with them. Our results are also consistent with Bagwell (1991) and Bagwell (1992), 
who find evidence that shareholders have heterogeneous expectations about firm value.
12
  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: Section II review the literature. Section III 
proposes the heterogeneous expectation model in the context of share repurchases.
13
 Section IV 
provides several testable predictions and discusses testing methodology. Sample statistics and 
empirical results are presented in Section V. Section VI tests the prediction on stock price 
following actual share repurchases and Section VII presents our conclusion. 
II. Review of the existing hypotheses and the puzzling empirical findings 
The undervaluation signaling hypothesis, one of the most popular arguments, is built 
upon information asymmetry theory.
14
 This hypothesis suggests that repurchased stocks are 
undervalued by investors due to information asymmetry. Announcements of share repurchases 
are signals from managers to dissipate information asymmetry. Extraordinary growth in share 
repurchases could be the evidence that repurchases are an efficient signaling tool to correct 
                                                 
12
 Huang and Thakor (2010)  also propose an investor-management agreement explanation on share repurchases. 
However, their paper focuses on the changes of agreement parameter around repurchases, rather than the 
changes of stock prices following actual share repurchases.  
13
 In a separate paper, we build a formal model based on Mayshar (1983), who provides the form of asset price at 
equilibrium with the heterogeneous investors and the presence of short sale constraints. 
14
 Theoretical works include Vermaelen (1984), Ofer and Thakor (1987), and Constantinides and Grundy (1989), 
among others. Empirical evidence has been suggested by Vermaelen (1981), Dann, Masulis and Mayers (1991), 
Comment and Jarrell (1991), D'Mello and Shroff (2000), Grullon and Michaely (2004), Louis and White (2007), and 
Massa, Rehman and Vermaelen (2007). 
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mispricing.
15
 However, recent empirical evidences from markets around the world impose 
doubts on this hypothesis.  Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) find a buy-and-hold 
portfolio, built after announcements, earns significant positive abnormal returns and suggest 
markets under-react to announcements. Such abnormal returns have also been documented in 
Canada (Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000)), UK (Rau and Vermaelen (2002)), and 
Japan (Zhang (2002)), etc. Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) confirm the persistency of such 
abnormal returns, and conclude that ‗Without under-reaction, such a strategy cannot be 
successful‘. 16  The persistent market under-reaction is inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
repurchase announcements are an efficient signaling tool.    
Another puzzling fact is that the post-announcement abnormal returns are driven by high 
book-to-market ratio firms. Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) find that the abnormal 
returns are concentrated in ‗value‘ stocks rather than ‗glamour‘ stocks. Ikenberry, Lakonishok 
and Vermaelen (2000), Zhang (2002), and Von Eije and Megginson (2008) confirm this pattern 
with data from Canada, Japan, and Europe.
17
 High book-to-market ratio firms are usually value 
firms with less growth opportunity. Their values are determined mainly by assets in place, rather 
than uncertain growth in the future. One would expect that high book-to-market ratio firms 
                                                 
15
Wansley, Lane and Sarkar (1989)  and Graham and Harvey (2001) survey the CFOs for the reasons for share 
repurchases and managers response undervaluation is their first motivation among others. 
16
 Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), “The nature and persistence of buyback anomalies,” Review of Financial Studies, 
22-4, page 1745. 
17
 Von Eije and Megginson (2008), however, provide a different explanation and focus on the substitution effect 
between dividends and share repurchases.  
43 
 
should have less information asymmetry problem.
18
 However, why do these less information-
asymmetric firms gain more from information signaling? Moreover, Barth and Kasznik (1999) 
examine 3,661 open market repurchase announcements and find that general information 
asymmetry is negatively related to the likelihood of repurchase announcements. We generalize 
the empirical findings and the theoretical predictions in figure 1. 
Figure 1 Hypotheses and empirical findings 
This table generalizes the empirical findings and the theoretical predications of the price/return 
behavior and the likelihood of share repurchases.  + (-) refers to a positive (negative) reaction or 
relationship correspond to an event. O refers to the theory predicts no reaction to an event.  
  Empirical evidence Heterogeneous 
expectation 
hypothesis 
Undervaluation-
Signaling 
hypothesis 
1. Announcement effect 
of share repurchase 
+ + + 
2. Post-announcement 
return 
+ + O 
3. Post-announcement 
drift in value firms 
+ + O 
4. Likelihood of share 
repurchase 
+(divergence of 
opinion)   - (information 
asymmetry) 
+ + 
 
Other proposed hypotheses may be used in explaining the motivation for share 
repurchases. These hypotheses include the excess capital distribution hypothesis which is based 
on agency theory, leverage hypothesis which is based on capital structure theory, anti-takeover 
hypothesis which is based on corporate governance literature, and etc. Dittmar (2000)  examines 
those hypotheses simultaneously from 1977 to 1996, and concludes that most hypotheses are 
                                                 
18
 This argument borrows the same idea as in Myers (1977) that a firm’s value is given by current assets and the 
value of real options from discretionary future investment opportunities.  
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only significant in a particular period, except for undervaluation-signaling and excess capital 
distribution hypotheses.
19
 
III. The model 
In this section, we introduce a simple model where investors have divergence of opinion on a 
firm value and do not update their beliefs even though they observe the manager’s repurchasing 
signal.20  
3.1 A Simple Model Built on Miller (1977) 
We first introduce the idea developed from Miller (1977). A firm has N shares and N 
shareholders, with each of them holds one share. Without divergence of opinion, all shareholders agree 
that the value of the firm is cP  per share, the respective demand curve of shares is OC in figure 2. With 
divergence of opinion, optimistic shareholders hold higher reservation value of the firm and the demand 
curves shift upwards. According to the marginal-investor theory, the stock price is determined by the 
most pessimistic investor.  From figure 2, one can see that the higher the divergence of opinion 
(AO>BO>CO), the higher the stock price ( CA BP P P  ). This is the Miller (1977)’s divergence of opinion 
driven ‘over-valuation’ hypothesis, where supply of shares or shares outstanding is fixed.  
 
Figure 2 Share repurchase with divergence of opinion and short sale constraints 
This figure is drawn as Miller (1977). X axis represents the number of shares or the number of investors, assuming 
one investor holds one share. Y axis represents the equilibrium stock price. Curve AO, BO, and CO are the demand 
curves on shares when investors hold different opinion on the firm‘s value. AO represents the case where investors 
                                                 
19
 See also Grullon and Ikenberry (2000), Allen and Michaely (2003) among others, for the review of motivation for 
share repurchase. 
20
 Conlon, Fuller and Wang (2011) propose models of share repurchase with investor divergence of opinion. They 
show that in the equilibrium of this simple model is similar to a complex model where heterogeneous investors 
update their beliefs but do not have the full information about actual share repurchases.   
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have the highest divergence of opinion while CO represents the case where investors hold homogeneous 
expectations. N and N‘ are the shares outstanding (supply) before and after the actual share repurchase.  
 
 
 
 
Now, let us consider a situation where the manager can endogenously determine the supply of 
shares through share repurchases. As long as the manager is not the most pessimistic one among all 
shareholders, he observes the current stock price as undervalued, and thus has incentive to repurchase 
shares. After share repurchases, the number of shares outstanding drops to N’. The equilibrium stock 
prices are
' ' '
C, ,A BP P P , respectively.  
Without the divergence of opinion, the stock price moves along the demand curve CO and does 
not change, 
'
C CP P . With the divergence of opinion, stock prices go up along the demand curves AO 
and BO and
' ',A A B BP P P P  . Therefore, the manager can push up the stock price by repurchasing 
N N
‘ 
P
A 
PA
‘ 
B O 
A 
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shares from pessimistic shareholders when the divergence of opinion exists. Furthermore, it is easy to 
show that
' '
A A B BP P P P   . The higher the divergence of opinion, the larger the price increases when 
the manager repurchases the same amount of shares.   
 
3.2 The Model of Share Repurchase with ‘Un-Smart’ Shareholders21 
A firm has N shares and N shareholders, with each of them hold one share.22 At the beginning, 
period 0, the firm has projects with future cash flow CF , which will be realized in the future, and ‘free’ 
cash 0C in hand.
23 Without the discount on time, the ‘true’ value of this firm is 0 4 0V V CF C   . 
With divergence of opinion, the shareholders hold different prior beliefs about the firm’s project 
future payoff.24  The most pessimistic shareholder believe the firm is worthy of
1 1
0V CF C  . 
According to the marginal-investor theory, his opinion determines the asset price, such that
1
0P V . 
With the wealth constraints, other optimistic shareholders are not able push up the stock price by 
buying his shares; with short sale constraints, the more pessimistic potential investors are not able to 
push down the price by short selling the stock. We outline the events of this four-period model in figure 
3. 
                                                 
21
 We use the ‘un-smart shareholders’ to refer investors who update their expectations as the stock price goes up, 
but they do not try to infer the manager’s repurchasing decision with the observed price information.  
22
 We look the manager as one of the shareholder and he also holds one share.  
23
 Since we do not restrict the sign of cash, one can always divide a firm’s assets into a project portfolio, which 
includes all the investments and future investment opportunities, and cash. A positive 0C  means the firm has 
excess cash and no good investment opportunities; zero value of 0C  means the firm exhausts its cash and 
investment opportunity simultaneously; while a negative sign means the firm will have to borrow to finance some 
possible investments. In the later cases, managers will have to borrow to finance share repurchases.  
24
 We assume no information asymmetry between the manager and shareholders, neither among shareholder 
themselves. The different expectation on the project payoff is due to different prior beliefs.  
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Figure 3 the time line of the model 
This figure outlines the sequence of events. Time 0 is the initial start point, where a firm has an ongoing project and 
cash. In period 1, the manager announces a share repurchase program. In period 2, the manager makes the offer and 
actually repurchases shares from the market. In response to the manager‘s offer, some shareholders tender their 
shares. Cash is spent on share repurchases. In period 3, the payoff of the firm‘s project is realized and distributed 
among remaining shareholders.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t=
0 
t=
1 
t=
2 
t=
3 
A firm has cash and a project with 
future cash flow, CF realized at t=3.  
Managers announce a share 
repurchasing program. 
Managers actually repurchase shares 
from market and the repurchasing 
program is completed.  Cash is spent 
on share repurchasing.  
The project payoff CF is realized and 
distributed among shareholders.   
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In period 1, the manager announces an open market share repurchasing program. Shareholders 
keep their belief unchanged.25 The equilibrium price is also unchanged, 1 0P P .  
 In period 2, the manager actually repurchases shares from the market, with an offering price
2 1P P . In response to this offer, shareholders tender their shares. However, with different evaluation 
on the firm, not every shareholder tenders his share, but only the ones whose reservation values are 
lower than 2P . The new marginal investor holds a reservation value equal to 2P and has no difference 
between tendering and holding his share. Thus, 2P  is the new equilibrium stock price and is greater than
1 0P P . The stock prices keep increases as long as the manager repurchases shares from the market. 
 During the period 2, cash 0C  is spent on repurchasing shares.
26 The firm’s project payoff CF is 
unaffected by repurchases. Each of remaining shareholders updates their beliefs about the firm value by 
a deduction of 0C , respectively.  
In period 3, the project payoff CF  is realized and distributed evenly among remaining 
shareholders.  
 
3.3 The Numerical Example for Price Drift and Long-term Abnormal Returns 
                                                 
25
 As we assume no information asymmetry between the manager and investors, there is no information released 
from repurchasing announcement. Shareholders, thus, do not update their beliefs in response to the 
announcement. However, as we assume investor heterogeneity, shareholders could have different opinion 
because they have different information process models, as suggested by Harris and Raviv (1993) and Anderson, 
Ghysels and Juergens (2005). In this framework, shareholders react differently to the common repurchasing 
announcement and their reservation values may divergent further.  
26
 One should notice that 0C is an arbitrage number. 0C at the beginning status can be set as any number and 
equal to the amount spent on actual repurchases. Extra cash can be integrated as part of the project.  
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We use a simple numerical example to illustrate the increases in a stock price following share 
repurchases. We also decompose the increases in stock price to analyze the price upward drift and the 
long-term abnormal returns.   
 For simplicity, we assume there are three shareholders and one manager in the firm. 
Each of them holds one share. Let the ‗true‘ value of the firm at liquidation be $48. If all 
shareholders keep their shares to the last period, each of them will equally acquire one-fourth of 
the firm‘s wealth, $12.  
With the divergent opinions, each of investor (including shareholders and the manager) 
has his own expectation on the firm‘s future value. Shareholder 1 (SH1) believes each share will 
be worth $10, $11 for shareholder 2 (SH2), and $13 for shareholder 3 (SH3). The manager, by 
chance, holds the belief of $12 each share.  
With short sale constraints, the stock price is traded at $10 per share, which represents the 
most pessimistic shareholder‘s opinion as suggested by marginal-investor-theory. From the point 
of the manager‘s view, the stock is undervalued. Without share repurchase, the expected payoffs 
for each of the investors are: SH1: 10, SH2: 11, M: 12, and SH3: 13.   
The manager first offers $11 to repurchase shares. Only shareholder 1 is willing to tender 
his share. After tendering, the stock price goes up to $11. The remaining shareholders and the 
manager update their expected payoffs as: SH2: 11, M: 12.3, and SH3: 13.6. 
As the stock price $11 is still below the manager‘s belief, he offers to repurchase again at 
$12. This time, only shareholder 2 tenders his share. After tendering, the stock price goes up to 
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$12. The manager and the shareholder 3 update their expected payoffs as: M: 12.5, and SH3: 
14.5. As the stock price is close to the manager‘s belief, he stops to repurchase any more shares.  
One can directly observe that the stock price goes up along the shareholders‘ reservation 
value schedule when the manager repurchases shares. This price rising is consistent with the 
stock price upward drift after the announcements of open market repurchase, as managers 
usually repurchase shares for a number of years after their announcements.  
The manager, by chance, holds an expectation about the firm‘s value equal to 
$15/share.27 Thus, the firm is undervalued from the managers‘ point of view (i.e. 0
$15P 
). The 
manager would be willing to offer $12/share to repurchase the 20 shares hold by those 
pessimistic shareholders. 
Furthermore, one can see that not only the stock price increase, but also the remaining 
shareholders‘ expected payoffs increase. As long as the manager is not over-optimistic, or the 
manager does not repurchase the shares at the price higher than the ‗true‘ value of each share, the 
remaining shareholders always gains from the share repurchases. The gains come from the 
wealth transfer from tendering shareholders to non-tendering shareholders.  
For example, at the first repurchase, the manager buys a piece of asset worth $12 at the 
cost of $11. There is $1 wealth transferred from shareholder 1 to other shareholders. We argue 
that the long-term abnormal returns come from the wealth transfer effect from actual share 
repurchases.  
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There is no arbitrage opportunity for outside investors. An arbitrager, who observes the 
manager‘s announcement and wants to takes advantages of future price drift and abnormal 
returns, has to buy shares from existing pessimistic shareholders. The purchases from the 
arbitrager will simply push up the stock price. As the price goes up the level of the manager‘s 
belief, the manager will not repurchase any shares. The arbitrager thus become a shareholder and 
cannot load off his shares unless he sells at lower price.  
There are limits of benefits from share repurchase too. First, the manager has to use free 
cash or low-cost debt to finance share repurchases. When considering the time value of the 
money, the cumulated interests could be too high between the time of repurchases and the time 
of future project payoff, the benefits from wealth transfer is limited. Second, the manager and 
remaining shareholders bear more idiosyncratic risk as some shareholders tender their shares. As 
suggested by Mayshar (1983) and Fama and French (2007), with divergence of opinion, the 
idiosyncratic risk is not fully diversifiable. Remaining shareholders ask for higher returns for 
bearing more idiosyncratic risk and push down the stock price.  
  
IV. Testable Predictions and Testing Methodology  
4.1 testable predictions 
A key aspect of our study is to differentiate between the investor‘s heterogeneous 
expectations and signaling hypothesis. Since the information asymmetry is not the main force 
generating different valuations in our model, including the information asymmetry variables 
should not affect the statistical significance of the coefficients on our proxy variables that 
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measure the divergence-of-opinion among investors. Our tests examine whether including the 
divergence-of-opinion proxies affects the statistical significance of variables that control for 
information asymmetry. Thus: 
H1: Firms with a higher divergence of investors‘ opinion are more likely to repurchase 
shares.  
As the difference in valuations between optimistic investors and pessimistic investors 
gets larger (i.e. divergence of opinion increases), the more shares managers will be willing to 
repurchase. Thus: 
H2: The higher the divergence of opinion, the larger the targeted fraction of shares in 
repurchasing announcements.   
The model suggests stock price increases following actual share repurchases, as 
pessimistic shareholders leave the market after tendering their shares. Since a repurchase 
program is usually completed across years, a long-term abnormal return could be the result of 
long-term repurchase program. Thus, in long-run, stock price should not increase if managers 
only announce but do not actually repurchase shares.  
H3: A firm does not earn long-term abnormal return following repurchase 
announcements, if managers do not actually repurchase shares.  
 Information asymmetry hypothesis argues that stock price will increase following 
repurchase announcements, because announcements signal a better future. Without the disclosure 
of actual share repurchases after announcements, investors have no reason to postpone their 
actions. Testing the prediction 3 would help to separate this model from signaling hypothesis. 
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Rather than attributing to investors‘ under reaction, our model suggests that the ‗long-term price 
drift‘ is because managers repurchase shares across a long period. 28  
 
4.2 testing methodology  
To examine the likelihood that a firm repurchases shares, we construct a sample of 
repurchasing and a matching sample of non-repurchasing firms. We then pool the repurchasing 
sample and non-repurchasing control sample as our full sample. The variable ,i tREPUR is set to 
one if a firm announces at least once open market repurchase in that year, and is equal to zero 
otherwise. Logistic regressions are run to test the likelihood ratio after including proxies control 
for different hypotheses.  
We choose four proxies to measure the divergence of opinion. The first proxy is the 
standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts divided by the mean of the analysts‘ forecasts, 
,1i tDisp , (see Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002)). For each month, we compute the monthly 
divergence of opinion for a firm by using the annual fiscal year earnings estimate for that month. 
We then estimate the average yearly divergence of opinion ( ,1i tDisp ) as the mean of the monthly 
divergence of opinion in any given year. Since the mean of analyst earnings forecast could be 
zero, and infinite analyst dispersion could be problematic, we choose an alternative measure
,3i tDisp , which we define as the standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts scaled by stock 
                                                 
28
 An even more direct test is to examine whether price increases right after managers repurchase shares from the 
market. Such a test will give us a clear episode of how actual share repurchases move the price. We are not able to 
test this prediction due to the limits of U.S. data in this paper. With the detailed data from Hong Kong market, we 
will be able to examine the price behavior around actual repurchase directly. 
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price.
29
 Our model suggests that it is the difference in valuations between optimistic and 
pessimistic investors that matter. Thus, our second proxy for the divergence of opinion is the 
difference between the highest earnings forecast and the lowest one, scaled by the absolute value 
of the mean earnings forecast.  
, , ,
, , ,
1 ( ) / ( ) ;
3 ( ) / _ Pr ;
i t i t i t
i t i t i t
Disp Std forecast Mean forecast
Disp Std forecast Stock ice

    
(4.1) 
We use the abnormal market adjusted turnover, ,i tAbto  (Hong and Stein (2007) and 
Garfinkel (2009)) and standardized unexplained stock trading volume, ,i tSUV  (Garfinkel and 
Sokobin (2006) and Garfinkel (2009)) as our third and fourth proxies for divergence of opinion. 
To avoid the less-trading-frequency problem, we first compute the weekly trading volume and 
return for each stock. The weekly market adjusted turnover is the firm‘s weekly trading volume 
divided by its shares outstanding minus the ratio of market total trading volume scaled by market 
total shares outstanding. The market adjusted turnover is calculated as the yearly average of 
weekly turnover for each firm year. Standardized unexplained stock trading volume measures the 
unexpected trading volume from the effect of both liquidity and information. Unexpected trading 
volume is the residual volume ( ,i t ) from a regression of the firm‘s weekly trading volume on 
weekly signed absolutely returns: 
 , , , ,i t i i i t i i t i tVolume R R   
 
    ,    (4.2) 
                                                 
29
 Since the result for ,1i tDisp  are essentially the same as for ,3i tDisp  , we report the result only for ,1i tDisp . 
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The plus and minus superscripts on the absolute valued returns indicate the sign of weekly returns. The 
standardized unexplained trading volume is the yearly average of such residuals scaled by the standard deviation 
of residual.  
Our study examines three measures of information asymmetry. First, we include a direct 
measure of information asymmetry by following Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004). They 
suggest that greater firm-specific variation in stock price represents more information 
compounded into price and thus less information asymmetry. This measure is also employed by 
Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000), Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004), Dittmar and Thakor 
(2007), and Duarte et al. (2008). The firm-specific variation, ,i tPsi , is defined as a natural log 
transformation (
2
2
1
ln( )
R
Psi
R

 ) of R-squares from the following regression:  
 , , , ,_ _i t i i i t i i t i tRet Ret Industry Ret market       , (4.3)  
The dependent variable ( ,i tRet ) is equal to the stock‘s weekly raw return, and the independent 
variables are industry- (defined as two-digital SIC code) and market-wide value-weighted 
weekly returns. Industry- and market-wide weekly return is calculated from the daily stock return 
collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Psi is an inverse measure of 
information asymmetry: a larger Psi reflects lower information asymmetry.  
 Second, researchers generally believe that analysts‘ forecasts improve a firm‘s 
information environment. For example, Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) suggest a measure 
for potential information asymmetry, covR ,  the residual of analyst coverage. covR is equal to 
the residual, ,i t , from yearly regressions of ln(1 + analyst coverage) on ln(MK) and ln(B/M) as 
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equation (4.4). A large residual implies a potential lack of analyst forecasts, and thus, the firm 
may suffer from information asymmetry.  
, 0 1 , 0 , ,log(1 _ ) ln( ) ln( / )i t i i i t i i t i tnumber analysts MK BK MK         
(4.4) 
 Similar to high book-to-market ratio firms, firms with a higher proportion of fixed assets 
should be more transparent, since the uncertainty about the value of intangible assets and growth 
opportunities is small. As our third measure of information asymmetry, we compute the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets (Dittmar and Thakor (2007)). The book-to-market ratio and the 
percentage of fixed assets also can be explained as proxies for growth opportunities.  
 To test the agency theory based excess-capital-distribution hypothesis, we include Cash  
and FCFs following Dittmar (2000). Cash  is defined as cash and equivalents scaled by total 
assets, while FCFs , free cash flows, is the ratio of net income before taxes plus depreciation and 
changes in deferred taxes and other deferred charges divided by total assets. As our third proxy 
for agency problems, we include OXD , the operating expenditure, defined as operating costs 
divided by total assets.  
 Although our model suggests that managers are more willing to repurchase shares when 
they can finance a share repurchase with excess cash flows, they will not do so if the cash flows 
can be used to finance good investment opportunities. Thus, managers in a firm with growth 
opportunity are less likely to repurchase, however, they will be forced to do so if investors worry 
the cash flows will not be spent on investment but consumed by managers. Following Barth and 
Kasznik (1999), we construct an index to capture excess cash and limited investment 
opportunities, CASHIND . CASHIND  is equal to cash from operations plus cash from investing 
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activities minus cash from financing activities other than that related to repurchases and cash 
dividends, divided by sales. As suggested by Barth and Kasznik (1999), using this proxy 
presumes firms do not issue debt to finance share repurchases other than to finance needs from 
operations or positive net present value projects.
30
  
 Recent literature suggests managers use share repurchases as an earnings management 
tool (Hribar, Jenkins and Johnson (2006), Roychowdhury (2006), and Gong, Louis and Sun 
(2008)). We include profit margin, PM , to capture the managers‘ earnings management 
incentive in share repurchases. Profit margin is defined as net income divided by sales.  
We control other firm characteristics which have been suggested to affect the decision to 
repurchase shares. We choose firm size, ln mk , measured as natural log of the firm‘s market 
value, which is equal to the average monthly stock price times shares outstanding; and the firm‘s 
book-to-market ratio,bmratio (see Fama and French (1993));
31
 and the past year average monthly 
return to capture the momentum effect.  
  We use a horse racing logistic regression (see Dittmar (2000)) to test the likelihood of 
share repurchases: 
 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1
4 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 ,
lni t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
Repur mk bmratio return
InfAsy Agency DO Earnings
   
    
  
   
   
    
, (4.5) 
Where,  InfAsy , Agency , DO , and Earnings represent a group of proxies for information 
asymmetry, agency problem, divergence of opinion, and earnings management as discussed 
                                                 
30
 Due to the lack of data, the variable CASHIND , as well as InTrading and InOwner ,  have not been 
applied to this version of the paper yet.   
31
 Please see Fama and French (1993) for the details for this measurement. 
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above. All independent variables are measured one year prior to the announcements of open 
market share repurchases.  
 To test hypotheses H1 and H2, we use only the share repurchase sample. We use both 
portfolio approach and regression approach to examine the relationship between the fraction of 
target shares and the determinants of share repurchases. We first sort the repurchasing sample by 
book-to-market ratio into quartiles, and then sort each quartile by proxies of share repurchase 
determinants into sub-quartiles. A positive difference in the fraction of target shares between the 
highest and the lowest repurchase determinant sub-quartile would suggest a positive effect of 
such determinant on share repurchases.  
 We then again run the horse race regression to examine the explanatory power of each 
repurchase determinant. We finally test the relative explanation power of each repurchase 
determinant by a pooled multi-factor regression.  
 The tests on hypothesis H3 requires different data and methodology, we will explain 
them in section V, together with a brief literature review. 
 
V. Sample Statistics and Empirical Results  
5.1 Sample selection and sample statistics 
We collect open market share repurchase data from the Securities Data Company (SDC) 
platinum. Our open market repurchase sample spans the period 1994 to 2003 and the selection 
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criteria is following Peyer and Vermaelen (2009).
32
 Specifically, we exclude repurchases driven 
by anti-takeover or going to private considerations. The shares repurchased must be common 
stock. We also require that sample firms are U.S. firms listed on the NYSE, Amex or NASDAQ, 
have available CRSP and Compustat data, and one week prior to announcement a stock price 
greater than $3/share.  In addition, we require the announced repurchase programs have the 
‗Completed‘ or ‗Intended to Completed‘ status in SDC till the end of 2009. Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998) find that not all firms finish their announced repurchasing programs. The 
managers‘ motivation for a repurchase may be unclear if they do not intend to finish the 
repurchasing program.  
We collect our matching sample from the population of non-repurchasing firms. In a 
given year, we build non-repurchasing population including firms that do not announce any type 
of share repurchases in three years around that year.
33
  We select matching sample following 
Grullon and Michaely (2004). We match the non-repurchasing firm with share repurchase 
sample by two-digital standard industry Classifications code first, and then matched by the 
market value and the book-to-market ratio of the firm.
34
 The matching score is given by:  
 2 2
_ _ / /
( ) ( )
_ _ / /
s m s m
s m s m
market value market value Book Market Book Market
MC
market value market value Book Market Book Market
 
 
      
(5.1) 
                                                 
32
 From 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) changes the disclosure policy and requires the firms 
to report their actual share repurchase activities at monthly basis.  
33
 Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Brockman and Chung (2001),  Zhang (2005), and Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) 
report that open market share repurchases usually take years for execution. One year lag after announcement 
limits the side effect from actual share repurchases.   
34
 If matching firm with two digital SIC code is not available, WE use firms matched with one digital SIC code 
instead.  
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The matching sample is built up year by year and selected from firms with lowest matching score 
without duplication.  
Analyst earnings forecasts data is collected from the First Call Historical Database 
(FCHD). FCHD contains consensus estimates of analyst earnings forecasts from 1990. Diether, 
Malloy and Scherbina (2002) examine the differential between the Detail History file and the 
Summary History file in I/B/E/S database and find that the results are very similar. We collect 
the estimate consensus, including mean, standard deviation, and number of analyst forecast, from 
FCHD directly. Ljungqvist, Malloy and Marston (2008) find a potential sampling problem due to 
the widespread ex post changes to the historical contents of the I/B/E/S database. As they 
suggest, we avoid such sampling problem by downloading the data after 2006. 
 We collect firm characteristics: total assets, book value of asset, fixed assets, cash and 
cash equivalent, sales, net income, operation costs, research & development expense, and tax and 
other deferred items from Compustat quarterly and annual data. The stock price, return, trading 
volume, and shares outstanding data are from the Center for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP) daily database. The firm‘s SIC code, and share code and listing information are from 
Compustat and CRSP, respectively. 
 Table 1 reports sample summary statistics. Panel A summarizes the full sample and 
suggests that the market values of the repurchasing and matching sample are similar. However, 
when compared to the matching firms, the repurchasing firms have a higher book-to-market 
ratio. This result casts first doubt on the argument that the book-to-market ratio solely drives the 
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share repurchases. Repurchase firms also have more cash and free cash flows than controlling 
sample, consistent with agency hypothesis and our model.  
Tabel1 Summary statistics of control variables for various subsamples 
Table1 provides medians for control variables for the full sample and several sub-samples. The variables details are: 
ln(mk), the natural log of market value; bmratio, the Fama and French (1993) Book-to-Market ratio; ln(AT), the 
natural log of total assets; Cash, the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, as in Dittmar (2000); CF, cash 
flow, the sum of net income before taxes plus depreciation and changes in deferred taxes and other deferred charges 
divided by total assets, as in Dittmar (2000); PM, profit margin, net income divided by sales; XRD,  the expenditure 
on R&D divided by sales; OXD, the operating costs, the total operation costs divided by sales; price, average stock 
price; stdprc, the standard deviation of monthly stock price; returns, the average monthly returns over 12-month 
period before repurchase announcement. All variables are observed at one fiscal year prior to the announcement of 
share repurchase. Non-repurchase sample is constructed as matching sample following Grullon and Michaely 
(2004). For each firm who announces open market repurchase in a year, we select the matching firm following rules: 
first, we require the matching population firms do not announce any type of repurchases in three years, one year 
before and one year after; second, we require the matching firm has the same two-digit SIC code as the announcing 
firm. If firm with same two-digit SIC code is not available, we use one digit SIC instead; third, we select the 
matching firm by picking up the smallest matching score without duplication. The matching score is computed as
2 2_ _ / /( ) ( )
_ _ / /
s m s m
s m s m
market value market value Book Market Book Market
MC
market value market value Book Market Book Market
 
 
 
. The subscripts s and m refer to 
sample and matching firms, respectively. All variables are measured in the fiscal year prior to the repurchase 
announcement. Panel A details the full sample. Panel B details firms in the higher and lower Book-to-market ratio 
quartile. Panel C details firms in the upper (high disagreement) and lower (low disagreement) quartile of the 
disagreement parameter, Disp1, the mean of the analyst forecast dispersion, which equals the mean of the standard 
deviation of analyst EPS forecasts divided by the mean of forecasts, as in Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) in 
the year prior to the repurchase announcement. Panel D details firms in the upper and lower quartile of the 
disagreement parameter, Disp1m, the median of the analyst forecast dispersion. P-values indicate if the Non-
repurchase and repurchase samples are significantly different from each other with respect to the sample median and 
spreads, using a nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.  ** and * represent statistical significance at 1% and 5% 
level, respectively.  
 Non-repurchase Repurchase p-Value of median p-Value of spreads 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Ln(mk) 13.47 13.54 0.49 0.37 
bmratio 0.5283 0.5197** 0.00 0.00 
Ln(AT) 6.85 7.11** 0.00 0.00 
Cash 0.0424 0.0492** 0.00 0.00 
CF 0.0351 0.0413** 0.00 0.00 
PM 0.0522 0.073** 0.00 0.00 
XRD 0.0578 0.0616 0.77 0.51 
OXD 0.8557 0.8278** 0.00 0.00 
price  24.41 26.38** 0.00 0.00 
stdprc 2.97 2.84 0.29 0.49 
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returns 0.0132 0.0148** 0.01 0.00 
# of obs. 2711
35
 1388   
 
 Non-repurchase Repurchase p-Value of median p-Value of spreads 
Panel B: high&low Book-to-Market ratio 
High Book-to-Market ratio 
Ln(mk) 12.96 12.55** 0.00 0.01 
bmratio 0.9589 0.9454 0.14 0.56 
Ln(AT) 7.02 7.05 0.95 0.92 
Cash 0.0242 0.0329** 0.00 0.00 
CF 0.0226 0.0301** 0.00 0.02 
PM 0.033 0.0607** 0.00 0.00 
XRD 0.0249 0.0357 0.65 0.32 
OXD 0.8736 0.8254** 0.00 0.00 
price  18.43 19.56 0.28 0.74 
stdprc 2.05 2.01 0.35 0.48 
returns 0.0083 0.0171** 0.00 0.00 
# of obs. 741 284   
Low Book-to-Market ratio 
Ln(mk) 14.42 14.53 0.68 0.39 
bmratio 0.2146 0.2495** 0.00 0.00 
Ln(AT) 6.76 6.84 0.07 0.10 
Cash 0.0866 0.0891* 0.04 0.15 
CF 0.0514 0.0532 0.62 0.69 
PM 0.0794 0.0793 0.16 0.06 
XRD 0.0823 0.0733 0.19 0.06 
OXD 0.8263 0.8228 0.53 0.57 
price  34.08 33.44 0.18 0.08 
stdprc 4.67 4.19 0.09 0.07 
returns 0.0186 0.0192* 0.04 0.00 
# of obs. 707 318   
 
Panel C: high&low agreement by Dispersion1_mean 
High Disagreement 
Ln(mk) 13.03 12.84 0.18 0.36 
bmratio 0.5896 0.5738 0.47 0.12 
Ln(AT) 6.35 6.26 0.36 0.38 
Cash 0.0492 0.0776** 0.00 0.00 
CF 0.0256 0.0289 0.67 0.86 
PM 0.0274 0.0393** 0.00 0.02 
XRD 0.0726 0.0836 0.21 0.08 
OXD 0.8883 0.8775 0.07 0.33 
                                                 
35
 The number of matching firms is different with the number of repurchasing sample is because some firms 
announce repurchases more than once in our full sample period. The matching firm could be different for the 
same repurchasing firm in the different announcement years.  
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price  18.03 18.59 0.42 0.47 
stdprc 2.84 2.46* 0.03 0.02 
returns 0.0089 0.0096 0.41 0.18 
# of obs. 744 381   
Low Disagreement     
Ln(mk) 13.94 13.96 0.59 0.29 
bmratio 0.4468 0.4915** 0.01 0.00 
Ln(AT) 7.32 7.87** 0.00 0.00 
Cash 0.0394 0.04393 0.33 0.44 
CF 0.04368 0.0466 0.27 0.21 
PM 0.0891 0.1085** 0.00 0.00 
XRD 0.0481 0.0428 0.93 0.90 
OXD 0.8021 0.7555** 0.00 0.00 
 Non-repurchase Repurchase p-Value of median p-Value of spreads 
price  30.87 31.18 0.72 0.36 
stdprc 3.27 3.12 0.68 0.86 
returns 0.0166 0.0159 0.96 0.86 
# of obs. 620 407   
 
Panel D: high&low agreement by Dispersion1_median 
High Disagreement 
Ln(mk) 13.38 13.39 0.73 0.81 
bmratio 0.5576 0.5328** 0.00 0.00 
Ln(AT) 6.72 6.84 0.11 0.38 
Cash 0.0445 0.0507* 0.05 0.06 
CF 0.0328 0.0396** 0.00 0.00 
PM 0.0451 0.0642** 0.00 0.00 
XRD 0.0594 0.0642 0.52 0.21 
OXD 0.8669 0.8436** 0.00 0.00 
price  22.52 24.32** 0.01 0.04 
stdprc 2.95 2.73* 0.05 0.11 
returns 0.0122 0.0142 0.06 0.00 
# of obs. 2078 995   
Low Disagreement 
Ln(mk) 13.65 13.66 0.72 0.37 
bmratio 0.5162 0.5068** 0.00 0.00 
Ln(AT) 6.99 7.25** 0.00 0.00 
Cash 0.0393 0.045* 0.02 0.03 
CF 0.0389 0.0441** 0.00 0.00 
PM 0.0629 0.0794** 0.00 0.00 
XRD 0.0514 0.054 0.77 0.98 
OXD 0.842 0.8157** 0.00 0.00 
price  26.33 28.21** 0.01 0.02 
stdprc 3.01 2.91 0.78 0.94 
returns 0.0148 0.0159 0.20 0.04 
# of obs. 1596 1118   
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 In panel B, we compare the repurchase sample with matching sample in the highest and 
lowest book-to-market ratio quartiles. The difference between the repurchasing firms and the 
matching sample changes as the book-to-market ratio changes. Significant differences exist in 
high book-to-market ratio firms, but, not in the low book-to-market ratio pairs. This result is 
consistent with the literature that book-to-market ratio is a key factor that affects share 
repurchases.  
 Panel C shows the results sorted by our key divergence of opinion variable, the 
dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts. Since the model predicts that it is the high divergence of 
opinion drives share repurchases, we expect the effect of book-to-market ratio and other 
variables are absorbed by the variable of divergence of opinion, especially in the highest 
divergence of opinion quartile. The results in panel C and D are exactly what we expect: the 
differences in book-to-market ratios, firm sizes, and free cash flows between the two samples 
become insignificant in the highest divergence of opinion quartile. In the lowest divergence of 
opinion quartile, the repurchase sample has a higher book-to-market ratio.  
 
5.2 The likelihood of share repurchases  
To examine the explanatory power of the book-to-market ratio, divergence of opinion, 
and other proxies suggested by the signaling and agency hypotheses, we run a horse racing 
regression. First, we run logistic regressions on variables from existing hypotheses. The results 
are presented in Table 2, Panel A.  
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Table 2 Horse races of logistic regression on share repurchase determinants 
This table reports the horse race logistic regression among several hypothesized motivations. The dependent 
variable equals one if a firm announces at least once open market share repurchase in that year, or else equals 
zero. Psi, another measure of information asymmetry, is defined as 
2 2ln (1 )i iPsi R R     as in Dittmar and 
Thakor (2007), where 
2
iR is industry i‘s average 
2R from a regression of firm-specific weekly returns on value-
weighted market and value-weighted industry indices. The industry is defined at the two-digital SIC code. Rcov, the 
residual of analyst coverage, is another measure of information asymmetry, defined as the residual from yearly 
regressions of ln(1 + analyst coverage) on ln(MV) and ln(B/M), as in Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002). We 
select, FA, the ratio of fixed assets to total assets as the third measure of information asymmetry, computed as in 
Dittmar and Thakor (2007). Disp1, the standard deviation of analyst annual EPS forecasts divided by the mean of 
forecasts as in Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002); Disp3, the standard deviation of analyst annual EPS forecasts 
divided by the stock price as in Garfinkel (2009); AbTO, the abnormal market adjusted turnover as in Hong and 
Stein (2007) and Garfinkel (2009), SUV, the standardized unexplained trading volume as in Garfinkel (2009), into 
quartiles. Other independent variables are defined as in table 1. We run general linear regression for every proxy 
for each hypothesis. We then select the best proxy for each hypothesis and run the pooled the multi-factor 
regression. The p-values are reported and the bold font represents significant at or less than 5% level.  
Panel A: logistic regression on information asymmetry and agency proxies 
Wald-score 50.57 50.38 21.71 52.68 46.58 45.80 67.59 
  logitO1 logitA1 logitA2 logitA3 logitI1 logitI2 logitI3 
intercept 0.317 0.288 0.714 -0.031 0.106 0.399 0.352 
 0.31 0.37 0.06 0.94 0.76 0.21 0.27 
bmratio 0.192 0.204 0.367 0.206 0.212 0.174 0.146 
 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.12 
Ln(mk) 0.028 0.029 -0.001 0.032 0.034 0.023 0.014 
 0.18 0.17 0.97 0.13 0.13 0.28 0.55 
PM -2.294 -2.303 -0.889 -1.987 -2.060 -2.126 -1.936 
 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
return -0.010 -0.026 -0.601 -0.029 -0.459 -0.418 -0.213 
 0.97 0.97 0.61 0.97 0.66 0.68 0.83 
Cash  0.100      
  0.71      
CF   -0.331     
   0.74     
OXD    0.326    
    0.16    
Psi     -0.063   
     0.07   
Rcov      -0.235  
      0.23  
Fix Assets       0.694 
       0.00 
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Penal B: logistic regression on divergence of opinion proxies and pooled multi-factor regression 
Wald-score 61.63 59.50 214.31 64.60 56.01 53.79 77.65 74.02 
  logitD1 logitD2 logitD3 logitD4 logitP1 logitP2 logitP3 logitP4 
intercept 0.152 0.243 1.237 0.923 0.057 0.109 -0.088 -0.003 
 0.64 0.44 0.00 0.01 0.87 0.76 0.83 0.99 
bmratio 0.186 0.173 0.101 0.196 0.189 0.184 0.154 0.146 
 0.05 0.07 0.29 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.13 
Ln(mk) 0.034 0.028 0.013 0.004 0.035 0.031 0.022 0.017 
 0.11 0.18 0.56 0.85 0.11 0.17 0.31 0.42 
PM -1.994 -2.097 -2.122 -2.289 -1.776 -1.889 -1.425 -1.538 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
return 0.212 0.206 0.349 -0.031 -0.185 -0.029 -0.029 -0.059 
 0.83 0.84 0.74 0.97 0.86 0.84 0.97 0.95 
Cash     -0.113 -0.029   
     0.68 0.91   
CF         
         
OXD       0.271 -0.268 
       0.24 0.25 
Psi     -0.042 -0.044   
     0.23 0.21   
Rcov         
         
Fix Assets       0.649 0.629 
       0.00 0.00 
Disp1 0.566    0.521  0.497  
 0.01    0.00  0.00  
Disp3  7.007    6.502  5.483 
  0.00    0.00  0.01 
Abto_median   -2.069      
   0.00      
SUV_median    1.381     
    0.00     
 
 
 
We find that firms with a high book-to-market ratio are more likely to repurchase shares. 
The sign of the coefficient for the book-to-market ratio is positive and statistically significant for 
most of the regression models. Consistent with the undervaluation signaling hypothesis, we find 
that firms with high information asymmetry are more likely to repurchase shares, as Psi  is 
negative and significant. We also find that repurchase firms have a lower profit margin after 
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controlling for other characteristics. The coefficient for PM is significant at the 1% level across 
all regressions. The fixed asset is positive and significant. Recall that the fixed assets could be 
proxy for both information asymmetry and growth opportunity. As a proxy for information 
asymmetry, the positive sign on fixed assets is inconsistent with the direct measure of 
information asymmetry, Psi . The positive coefficient on fixed assets may also suggest the 
repurchase firms have less growth opportunity. This result, combined with the negative sign on 
profit margin, implies that managers tend to repurchase share when the firm has lower income 
and less growth opportunities. This implication is consistent with the argument that repurchases 
are an earnings management tool.
36
 However, we do not find evidence to support the agency 
problem hypothesis. The coefficient for Cash , FCFs , and OXD  are not statistically significant.  
 Panel B shows the regressions results when we add our proxies for the divergence of 
opinion. Consistent with the prediction of the model, all proxies of divergence of opinion are 
positive and significant at the 1% level. Firms with higher divergence of opinion are more likely 
to repurchase shares. More strikingly, we find that after including the divergence of opinion 
variables, the effect of book-to-market ratio becomes insignificant, consistent with the results in 
panel C and D, table 1. Profit margin is negative and significant.  
 Finally, as in Dittmar (2000), we put all proxies for different hypotheses into one 
regression and examine which one has the most explanatory power. As the model predicts, 
proxies of divergence of opinion are positive and significant. The profit margin is positive and 
                                                 
36
 For the literature on this argument, see Roychowdhury (2006), Hribar, Jenkins and Johnson (2006), Gong, Louis 
and Sun (2008), among others. 
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significant, and the information asymmetry proxies lost their explanatory power. The positive 
signs on both fixed assets and divergence of opinion proxies, together with the negative sign on 
profit margin, indicate that when investors have different opinions about the firm‘s future and the 
firm has no better investment opportunity, the managers often repurchase shares from pessimistic 
shareholders.  
Overall, the results in table 2 are consistent with our theoretical prediction 1 that the 
divergence of opinion affects the decision to repurchase share. We confirm the results of existing 
literature that the book-to-market ratio and information asymmetry are positively related to the 
likelihood of a share repurchase. However, we also show that divergence of opinion has 
incremental explanatory power than the book-to-market ratio and information asymmetry.  
 
5.3 The fraction of target shares in announcements of open market repurchases  
From the point of classical signaling theory, the announcements of open market share 
repurchases are not a convincing signal. First, open market repurchase announcements are not a 
commitment. There is no penalty for non-execution, and firms can stop or withdrawn from a 
repurchasing program at any time. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) report that approximately one-
half of firms announcing a share repurchase bought their target number. More than 10 percent of 
repurchasing firms bought less than 5% of target shares during the three-year period following 
the announcement. Second, such repurchase announcements do not contain much solid 
information. The only numbers in the announcements are what percent of the firm‘s shares the 
managers intend to buy. An open market repurchasing program usually does not have a fixed 
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ending date. Third, until 2004, managers did not have to disclose the actual shares repurchased in 
their financial statements. To examine the strength of the motivation behind a repurchase 
announcement, we use the targeted fraction of shares to be repurchased.  
We test our hypothesis H2 by examing the relationship between the fraction of target 
shares in announcements and the suggested proxies. We then run a general linear regression 
while controlling for various firm characteristics. As in Fama and French (1993), we double sort 
the share repurchasing sample by the book-to-market ratio and other hypothesized motivation 
proxies. The results are reported in table 3.  
 
Table 3 percentage of shares sought and the percentage of announced program completed 
Table3 provides mean (%sought_mean) and median of percentage (%sought_median) of shares sought for a 
repurchasing program and the percentage of completed open market repurchase program (%completed) across 
subsamples sorted by measures of information asymmetry and agency problems. The full sample covers all open 
market repurchase programs with ‗Completed‘ and ‗Intended to Completed‘ status in the SDC platinum through 
1994 to 2003.  The sample are first sorted by Fama and French (1993) Book-to-Market ratio and then proxies: Psi, 
another measure of information asymmetry, is defined as 
2 2ln (1 )i iPsi R R     as in Dittmar and Thakor 
(2007), where 
2
iR is industry i‘s average 
2R from a regression of firm-specific weekly returns on value-weighted 
market and value-weighted industry indices. The industry is defined at the two-digital SIC code. Rcov, the residual 
of analyst coverage, is another measure of information asymmetry, defined as the residual from yearly regressions of 
ln(1 + analyst coverage) on ln(MV) and ln(B/M), as in Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002). We select, FA, the 
ratio of fixed assets to total assets as the third measure of information asymmetry, computed as in Dittmar and 
Thakor (2007).   The higher Rcov, lower Psi, and lower FA represent the higher information asymmetry. Cash and 
free cash flows are measures of potential agency problem motivated repurchase, as in Dittmar (2000). Cash is the 
sum of cash and cash equivalent divided by total assets, while CF is the cash flow, the net income before taxes plus 
depreciation and changes in deferred taxes and other deferred charges divided by total assets. Results are represented 
in panel A, B, C, D, and E, respectively. All variables are measured one year prior to the announcement of share 
repurchase. 
 
Panel A: Double sort by B/M ratio and firm specific risk (Psi), high Psi, low Inf. Asy.  
bmq Psi obs. %sought_mean %sought_median %completed 
lowest lowest 110 8.45 6.15 11% 
2 80 8.28 6.10 20% 
3 89 7.49 5.60 9% 
largest 68 8.00 6.45 25% 
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2 lowest 104 7.65 6.40 20% 
2 88 6.46 6.05 10% 
3 67 6.05 5.00 16% 
largest 88 9.81 6.50 13% 
3 lowest 86 5.88 5.00 17% 
2 88 6.71 5.20 13% 
3 94 7.32 5.45 14% 
largest 79 8.36 5.80 24% 
largest lowest 75 7.54 5.60 12% 
2 82 6.74 5.00 13% 
3 88 8.89 8.05 16% 
largest 103 9.15 7.90 20% 
      
      
 
 
 
      
      
      
Panel B: Double sort by B/M ratio and residual of analyst coverage 
bmq Rcov obs. %sought_mean %sought_median %completed 
lowest lowest 101 8.42 6.20 10% 
2 71 8.19 6.10 18% 
3 80 7.54 5.60 15% 
largest 95 8.08 6.20 19% 
2 lowest 95 7.07 6.20 14% 
2 79 7.08 5.70 19% 
3 90 7.94 6.00 12% 
largest 83 8.27 6.00 16% 
3 lowest 88 7.82 5.15 17% 
2 93 7.02 5.40 15% 
3 83 6.06 5.00 22% 
largest 83 7.25 5.30 13% 
largest lowest 91 9.42 7.40 13% 
2 94 7.38 5.50 10% 
3 86 7.74 6.60 21% 
largest 77 8.12 6.90 21% 
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Panel C: Double sort by B/M ratio and Fixed Assets 
bmq FAq obs. %sought_mean %sought_median %completed 
lowest lowest 22 5.79 4.90 14% 
2 126 7.29 6.10 13% 
3 124 9.30 6.80 20% 
largest 75 8.04 5.60 12% 
2 lowest 81 6.07 5.00 9% 
2 89 7.52 6.50 19% 
3 95 7.75 6.50 19% 
largest 82 8.96 5.90 12% 
3 lowest 122 6.19 5.00 14% 
2 67 7.61 6.30 16% 
3 77 7.78 5.60 21% 
largest 81 7.18 5.20 17% 
largest lowest 153 6.92 5.10 19% 
2 55 9.04 7.00 9% 
3 41 8.76 7.50 27% 
largest 99 9.36 8.30 10% 
 
 
Panel D: Double sort by B/M ratio and Cash 
bmq Cash obs. %sought_mean %sought_median %completed 
lowest lowest 71 9.86 6.20 18% 
2 63 7.56 5.60 17% 
3 76 8.19 6.60 12% 
largest 137 7.32 5.70 15% 
2 lowest 82 8.37 6.00 13% 
2 89 6.22 5.00 12% 
3 77 6.75 6.00 14% 
largest 99 8.80 7.80 19% 
3 lowest 88 7.66 5.80 19% 
2 81 6.39 5.00 12% 
3 108 6.28 5.00 16% 
largest 70 8.23 5.70 20% 
largest lowest 109 8.87 7.90 17% 
2 113 7.72 6.40 20% 
3 85 7.82 5.60 12% 
largest 41 8.27 6.30 10% 
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Panel E: Double sort by B/M ratio and Cash Flows 
bmq CF obs. %sought_mean %sought_median %completed 
lowest lowest 125 7.38 6.00 15% 
2 43 7.38 6.30 16% 
3 71 8.19 5.90 15% 
largest 108 9.09 5.90 15% 
2 lowest 152 6.84 5.15 14% 
2 68 8.47 6.40 25% 
3 73 8.80 7.00 11% 
largest 54 6.91 6.00 11% 
3 lowest 207 6.82 5.10 14% 
2 46 6.82 5.80 28% 
3 51 8.76 5.50 20% 
largest 43 6.35 5.00 12% 
largest lowest 230 7.77 6.25 16% 
2 68 8.17 7.05 19% 
3 30 10.62 6.80 10% 
largest 20 9.09 9.20 15% 
 
 
 To test the information asymmetry hypothesis, we double sort the repurchasing sample 
by book-to-market ratio and information asymmetry proxies, Psi , and covR . The results are 
presented in table 3, panels A and B, respectively. The fraction of target shares, measured as 
mean and median of percentage shares sought increases with Psi , and increases only in high 
book-to-market ratio quartiles (quartile 3 and 4). Recall that Psi is an inverse measure of 
information asymmetry. The larger the Psi , the smaller is the information asymmetry. Thus, the 
increasing in the fraction of target shares along with Psi  suggests that firms actually intend to 
repurchase less when information asymmetry is higher. This result implies that, if different 
opinion component caused by information asymmetry can be absorbed by divergence of opinion, 
information asymmetry may actually keep managers from repurchasing shares. We argue that the 
reason is because with high information asymmetry, managers face server adverse selection 
costs. Similar to the idea in Miller and Rock (1985), managers bear high adverse selection costs 
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and lose to informed traders in the markets. In the high book-to-market ratio quartiles, we also 
find that the less the information asymmetry, the more likely the firm will finish the repurchasing 
program.  
 The results from double-sorting on the book-to-market ratio and fixed assets are reported 
in panel C. Consistent with the results from direct measure of information asymmetry, the 
indirect measure of information asymmetry, fixed assets, also has a positive relationship with the 
fraction of target shares. The mean and median of percentage shares sought increase with the 
value of fixed assets and this pattern is consistent across all book-to-market ratio quartiles, 
except for the lowest one. Overall, the results suggest that if the fraction of target shares in 
repurchasing announcements is a signaling tool used by managers, information asymmetry 
actually reduces the motivation for managers to use such a tool and adds additional costs to 
accomplish their commitments. 
 We then examine the excess capital distribution hypothesis by double-sorting the sample 
on book-to-market ratio and Cash and Cash Flows. We do not find a significant pattern across 
quartile portfolios sorted by Cash, as presented in table 3, panel D. However, the fraction of 
target shares increases with the amount of free cash flows in the highest book-to-market ratio 
quartile, which is consistent with the excess capital distribution hypothesis.  
 We have re-examined the existing literature and the results support the undervaluation 
hypothesis as the significance is driven by high book-to-market ratio firms. However, rather than 
supporting the information asymmetry explanation, the evidence suggests that the potential 
adverse selection problem caused by information asymmetry might reduce the motivation for 
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managers to repurchase shares. Our results weakly support the excess-capital-distribution 
hypothesis. 
 We then double sort the repurchasing sample by book-to-market ratio and four 
divergence of opinion proxies, 1Disp , 2Disp , Abto , and SUV . Results are reported in table 4.   
Table 4 percentage of shares sought and the announced program completed – divergence of 
opinion 
Table 4 provides mean (%sought_mean) and median of percentage (%sought_median) of shares sought for a 
repurchasing program and the percentage of completed open market repurchase program (%completed) across 
subsamples sorted by measures of divergence of opinion. The full sample covers all open market repurchase 
programs with ‗Completed‘ and ‗Intended to Completed‘ status in the SDC platinum through 1994 to 2003.  The 
sample are double sorted by Fama and French (1993) Book-to-Market ratio and disagreement measures: Disp1, the 
standard deviation of analyst annual EPS forecasts divided by the mean of forecasts as in Diether, Malloy and 
Scherbina (2002); Disp3, the standard deviation of analyst annual EPS forecasts divided by the stock price as in 
Garfinkel (2009); AbTO, the abnormal market adjusted turnover as in Hong and Stein (2007) and Garfinkel (2009), 
SUV, the standardized unexplained trading volume as in Garfinkel (2009), into quartiles. Results are represented in 
panel A, B, C, and D, respectively. Panel E reports the correlation coefficient among share repurchase determinants 
and the percentage of shares sought. All variables are measured one year prior to the announcement of share 
repurchase.  
Panel A: Double sort by B/M ratio and Dispersion of Analyst Earnings Forecasts/Mean 
bmq Disp1q obs. %sought_mean %sought_median %completed 
lowest lowest 94 7.50 5.65 14% 
2 88 7.34 5.45 18% 
3 84 10.01 7.70 15% 
largest 81 7.53 5.80 14% 
2 lowest 100 6.66 5.00 14% 
2 80 7.60 6.40 10% 
3 95 8.67 6.10 11% 
largest 72 7.41 6.40 29% 
3 lowest 96 6.34 5.00 23% 
2 84 6.80 5.00 17% 
3 77 8.32 5.40 17% 
largest 90 6.85 5.95 9% 
largest lowest 57 6.14 5.00 19% 
2 94 8.29 6.50 11% 
3 92 8.40 7.05 22% 
largest 104 9.00 7.95 13% 
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Panel B: Double sort by B/M ratio and Dispersion of Analyst Earnings Forecasts/Price 
bmq Disp3q obs. %sought_mean %sought_median %completed 
lowest lowest 64 8.32 5.40 14% 
2 70 8.22 6.00 16% 
3 58 8.02 6.15 17% 
largest 46 8.10 6.20 20% 
2 lowest 78 6.29 5.00 12% 
2 82 7.43 5.75 15% 
3 96 7.18 6.15 13% 
largest 64 9.03 6.77 23% 
3 lowest 56 6.73 5.00 20% 
2 106 7.26 5.05 24% 
3 85 6.85 5.20 14% 
largest 69 6.94 5.20 10% 
largest lowest 54 7.74 5.10 24% 
2 58 7.69 6.70 19% 
3 79 7.73 5.60 14% 
largest 67 8.24 7.40 12% 
 
 
 
Panel C: Double sort by B/M ratio and Abnormal Market Adjusted Turnover 
bmq AbTOq obs. %sought_mean %sought_median %completed 
lowest lowest 102 7.98 5.85 8% 
2 78 6.98 5.75 26% 
3 83 6.72 5.00 17% 
largest 84 10.54 7.55 13% 
2 lowest 103 7.92 6.00 10% 
2 75 6.99 5.80 23% 
3 71 7.26 6.00 23% 
largest 98 7.91 6.40 9% 
3 lowest 100 7.51 5.10 16% 
2 88 6.49 5.00 17% 
3 95 6.43 5.40 22% 
largest 64 8.02 5.55 9% 
largest lowest 115 7.86 6.50 15% 
2 82 7.55 6.70 20% 
3 74 8.56 5.30 11% 
largest 77 8.91 8.20 18% 
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Panel D: Double sort by B/M ratio and Standardized Unexplained Trading Volume 
bmq SUVq obs. %sought_mean %sought_median %completed 
lowest lowest 72 9.49 6.50 15% 
2 78 8.20 6.65 14% 
3 84 6.97 5.55 19% 
largest 113 7.91 5.60 13% 
2 lowest 88 8.47 6.75 18% 
2 90 7.20 6.00 9% 
3 84 6.67 5.10 18% 
largest 85 7.98 6.30 15% 
3 lowest 89 6.63 5.20 11% 
2 78 6.29 5.00 18% 
3 102 7.85 5.85 17% 
largest 78 7.23 5.20 22% 
largest lowest 117 8.66 6.90 20% 
2 95 8.14 6.60 17% 
3 71 7.56 6.20 10% 
largest 65 7.98 6.60 14% 
 
 
 Panel A and B report mean and median of the fraction of target shares in announcements 
across quartiles sorted by book-to-market ratio and divergence of opinion measured from 
dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts. The value of the fraction of target shares increases with 
the estimate of divergence of opinion in both panels A and B. Especially, in panel B, the median 
increases monotonically with the dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts scaled by stock price 
across all four book-to-market quartiles. It‘s the first time in this paper we observe the 
repurchasing motivation proxy dominates the book-to-market ratio. This result is consistent with 
our hypothesis H2 that firms will announce more target shares when the divergence of opinion is 
higher. The incremental explain power of divergence of opinion over book-to-market ratio also 
suggests that the divergence of opinion is a key determinant in the decision of share repurchases. 
Additionally, we find an interesting pattern from the repurchasing program completion rate 
across quartiles. The completion rate increases as the divergence of opinion increases in the low 
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book-to-market ratio quartiles. This is evidence that supports prediction 3 firms with higher 
divergence of opinion will not only announce more target shares, but also indeed repurchase 
more shares.  However, a puzzle appears in the high book-to-market ratio quartiles: the 
completion rate decreases as the divergence of opinion increases. This result implies that 
although managers intend to announce large amount of target shares, constraint by high book-to-
market ratios, they have no ability to repurchase such amount.   
 The portfolios built on divergence of opinion proxy, Abto , also suggest the fraction of 
target shares increases with the divergence of opinion. Although the trends through quartile 1 to 
quartile 4 in each book-to-market ratio subsample are not as consistent as the ones in 1Disp and
2Disp quartiles, the fraction of target shares in quartile 4 is still significantly greater than the 
fraction in quartile 1. The results from our forth proxy of divergence of opinion, SUV , are 
however, mixed and insignificant. The in-significant results from Abto  and SUV  are expected. 
Remember that both abnormal turnover and standardized unexplained trading volume are 
computed from stock trading volume, shares outstanding, and returns. As long as firms actually 
repurchase shares after repurchase announcement, shares outstanding must change. Therefore, 
the value of Abto and SUV are affected by share repurchase itself and are no longer exogenous 
variables. Later on, we will show that their coefficients in regression analysis are also in-
significant as expected.  
 Overall, the results are consistent with hypothesis H2 that firms with higher divergence of 
opinion announce more target shares in announcements. The larger repurchasing completion 
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rates in the high 1Disp  quartiles, especially in low book-to-market ratio subsample, suggest that 
those firms not only intend to repurchase more shares, but also actually repurchase those shares.  
 Before we jump into regression analysis, we examine the correlation coefficients among 
those variables. Since we have multiple proxies for each hypothesis, correlation coefficient will 
tell us where the potential multiple collinear problems could come from. We choose only one 
proxy for each hypothesis in the regression analysis. The correlation coefficients are reported in 
table 5.  
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Tab le 5 Correlation coefficients for repurchase sample 
 bmratio Ln(mk) PM Ret Cash CF OEFF Psi Rcov fixasset Disp1 Disp3 Abto 
bmratio 1.00             
Ln(mk) -0.31 1.00            
 0.00             
PM -0.06 0.13 1.00           
 0.02 0.00            
Returns 0.00 -0.01 0.09 1.00          
 0.99 0.68 0.00           
Cash -0.16 -0.06 0.06 0.06 1.00         
 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02          
CF -0.11 0.07 0.50 0.15 0.09 1.00        
 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01         
OXD -0.05 -0.12 -0.55 -0.05 0.01 -0.13 1.00       
 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.72 0.00        
Psi 0.09 0.21 0.07 -0.16 -0.23 0.04 -0.09 1.00      
 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00       
Rcov 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.14 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 1.00     
 0.55 0.77 0.67 0.00 0.45 0.35 0.39 0.08      
fixasset 0.00 0.07 -0.21 -0.06 -0.16 0.07 0.11 0.10 -0.01 1.00    
 0.91 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.79     
Disp1 0.05 -0.12 -0.23 -0.12 0.07 -0.19 0.10 -0.13 0.00 0.07 1.00   
 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.94 0.01    
Disp3 0.10 -0.13 -0.25 -0.11 0.05 -0.16 0.13 -0.13 0.06 0.16 0.64 1.00  
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00   
Abto_median 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.12 -0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.21 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 1.00 
 0.33 0.58 0.19 0.00 0.03 0.29 0.64 0.00 0.18 0.58 0.38 0.07  
SUV_median -0.15 0.28 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.06 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 
 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.76 0.78 0.07 0.33 0.20 0.86 0.04 0.14 0.25 0.94 
7
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 We adopt three variables to proxy for agency problem: Cash, Free Cash Flows, and 
Operation Expenditure. Among them, Cash and Free Cash Flows are significant correlated, but 
the correlation coefficient is less than 0.1. Free Cash Flows and Operation Expenditure are also 
negatively significantly correlated with -0.13 coefficient estimates. Among three proxies for 
information asymmetry, Psi , and Fixed Assets are significantly correlated with coefficient 0.1. 
As expected, two proxies for divergence of opinion estimated from analyst earnings forecast 
data, 1Disp and 3Disp are positively significantly correlated with a coefficient value 0.64. We 
drop one of them in our regression analysis. The result form general linear regression analysis is 
reported in table 6.  
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Table 6 regression analysis on determinants of the fraction of target shares in announcements  
This table reports the horse races on general linear regression among several hypothesized motivations after controlling for heterogeneous error and 
year-trend. The dependent variable is the fraction of target shares (parentage of shares sought). The independent variables are defined as in table 4. 
We run general linear regression for every proxy for each hypothesis. We then select the best proxy for each hypothesis and run the pooled the multi-
factor regression. The p-values are reported and the bold font represents significant at or less than 5% level.  
 
 
 
Fit-value 3.73 3.29 5.95 3.46 5.78 5.06 5.55 6.42 7.31 5.75 5.4 6.38 
  O A A A IA IA IA DO DO DO DO Pool 
Inter. 11.89 12.36 8.814 11.147 11.840 10.012 10.618 10.155 10.015 10.918 10.579 9.472 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
bmratio -0.325 -0.353 -0.242 -0.226 -0.385 -0.008 -0.332 -0.37 -0.444 -0.324 -0.350 -0.418 
 0.43 0.47 0.56 0.64 0.36 0.98 0.43 0.37 0.28 0.43 0.39 0.32 
lnmk -0.277 -0.338 -0.269 -0.350 -0.330 -0.264 -0.306 -0.261 -0.261 -0.288 -0.281 -0.296 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
pm -3.657 0.660 -2.098 0.683 -3.805 -3.256 -3.268 -3.117 -2.745 -4.048 -4.142 -0.358 
 0.02 0.78 0.27 0.8 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.85 
return -6.981 -11.87 -5.657 -10.74 -4.176 -4.370 -5.516 -4.105 -3.988 -6.667 -5.695 -2.206 
 0.14 0.03 0.22 0.05 0.38 0.35 0.24 0.37 0.39 0.15 0.22 0.64 
cash 1.642            
 0.14            
Cash Flow  -1.755           
  0.66           
OXD   1.833         1.871 
   0.05         0.04 
RE    0.404         
    0.75         
Psi     0.293       0.362 
     0.04       0.01 
Rcov      0.569       
      0.49       
Fix Assets       1.173      
       0.08      
Disp1        1.593     
        0.05     
Disp3         35.1677   35.287 
         0   0 
Abto          -0.926   
          0.11   
SUV           -0.349  
           0.81  
8
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 The horse racing regression analysis is similar to the one in testing prediction 1 and 2. 
We first run a regression without controlling for any other hypothesized motivations to test the 
effect of firm‘s size, book-to-market ratio, and stock return momentum on share repurchase. We 
find that large firms tend to announce small fraction of target shares in repurchase 
announcement. This result is expected. Small firms usually have fewer shares outstanding; 
therefore, with same amount of shares sought in announcement, small firms have a larger 
fraction of target shares. The book-to-market ratio and past year returns are not significant. 
Interestingly, the firm‘s profit margin is significantly negatively related with the fraction of 
target shares. The negative coefficient implies that firms with trouble in increasing or keeping 
earnings tend to announce large number of target shares. By reducing more shares outstanding, 
managers can artificially increase earnings per share.  
 We then test the excess capital distribution hypothesis by adding proxy for agency 
problem. Although Cash and Free Cash Flows are not significant as predicted by agency problem 
based cash distribution hypothesis, we do find that firms announce larger fraction of target shares 
have higher operation costs, which implies potential agency problem. Together with the negative 
coefficient on Profit margin, the result suggests that managers spend too much in operation, 
however, cannot improve the earnings. 
 Consistent with the results from portfolio approach analysis, the information asymmetric 
proxy Psi has a significant and positive sign. Firms with less information asymmetry problem 
announce more target shares, although the likelihood test in table 2 suggests information 
asymmetry is a reason why firms announce share repurchases. This seemly contradict result is 
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consistent with the fact that although repurchases are not a commitment, as Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998)argue, firms a large proportion of announcing firms still repurchases their target 
shares and finish the program. We, again, tend to conclude that the potential adverse selection 
costs due to information asymmetry actually are resistant for managers actual share repurchases.  
 As the model predicted, two proxies for divergence of opinion, 1Disp and 3Disp , are 
both positive and significant. Consistent with the results in portfolio approach, other two proxies, 
Abto and SUV , are neither significant. We therefore will drop these two proxies.  Since 3Disp
has a higher significance level than 1Disp , we choose 3Disp as our best proxy for divergence of 
opinion in pool horse race regression.  
 Before we run the horse race, the changes on the coefficient of Profit margin draw us 
attentions. This coefficient keeps negative and significant at 5% level through all above 
regressions. This seems strongly support the Roychowdhury (2006) earnings management tool 
hypothesis. However, after including 3Disp , the significant level of Profit margin reduces to 
10% level. We argue that the decreases in the explanation power of Profit margin are because 
investors have different opinions on the share repurchasing firm‘s profit ability, although share 
repurchasing firms generally have low level of profit ability. The one who accept the firm‘s 
profit ability will hold her shares, while the other who is not satisfied will tender shares.  
 The pooled horse race regression confirms our model prediction 3 and 4, as well as our 
conjectures on adverse selection costs and firms‘ profitability. Divergence of opinion 
significantly affects the fraction of targeted shares in announcements. The large the divergence 
of opinion, the larger is the number of targeted shares. Rather than information asymmetry 
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driving the share repurchases, the adverse selection costs due to information asymmetry are 
resistant for managers to repurchase shares. Profitability becomes insignificant as expected.     
 
VI. Long-term price drift and actual share repurchases 
Long-term abnormal returns following announcement of open market share repurchases 
were early documented by Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995), followed by Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000), Rau and Vermaelen (2002), Zhang (2002) and Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009). The abnormal returns due to long-term price upward drift have been 
attributed to investors‘ under-reaction (Grullon and Michaely (2004)) or mistakes (Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009)). However, those explanations bring out further questions: why investors keep 
under reacting or making mistakes in share repurchases. Our model suggests that investors 
neither under-react to announcements of share repurchase, nor do they continuously make 
mistakes. Investors choose to tender or hold their shares based on their own opinions. The long-
term price drift is due to the property of the long-term open market repurchasing program. 
We test hypothesis H3 by looking at actual share repurchase data. We first select firms 
who announce open market share repurchases from SDC platinum. We screen the sample firms 
with same conditions as early. Starting from 2004, the SEC requires firms to report actual share 
repurchase information. We collect the actual share repurchase information in firm‘s quarterly 
reports from Compustat Quarterly data. The final sample covers from 2004 to 2008 and the 
sample statistics are reported in table 7.   
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Table7 Actual share repurchase sample statistics  
This table reports the sample statistics for firms announce open market share repurchase from 2004 to 2008. 
%sought is the percentage of shares sought (the fraction of target shares) in a repurchase announcement. Book-to-
market ratio is calculated as Fama and French (1993) and Size is measured as the market value of the repurchasing 
firm at the end of year prior to announcement of share repurchase. CAR is the three-day cumulative market excess 
return around the announcement of share repurchase, as in Peyer and Vermaelen (2009).  Panel A reports the 
statistics for firms whose repurchasing programs are labeled as ‗Completed‘ or ‗Intend to Completed‘ in SDC 
database, while panel B reports statistics for ‗Completed‘ firm only. Panel C represents the three days cumulative 
market excess returns around announcements. 
 
Panel A Firms with ‗Completed‘ or ‗Intend to completed‘ repurchasing program 
year # of firms %sought Book/market Size 
2004 7102 7.68 0.9327 6.5767 
2005 6828 8.07 0.8927 6.6509 
2006 6514 8.15 0.8747 6.7424 
2007 6015 7.80 0.9504 6.8361 
2008 5303 7.94 1.2595 7.0084 
 
Panel B Firms with ‗Completed‘ repurchasing program only 
year # of firms %sought Book/Market size 
2004 2430 10.40 1.0235 6.7754 
2005 2307 6.98 0.9595 6.8269 
2006 2170 8.58 0.9431 6.9479 
2007 1982 6.48 1.0201 7.0399 
2008 1773 8.12 1.3418 7.1871 
 
Panel C Three-day cumulated market excess return around announcements by firms with ‗Completed‘ or ‗Intend 
to completed‘ repurchasing program 
year CAR %sought 
2004 1.64% 7.91 
2005 1.28% 8.35 
2006 1.55% 8.08 
2007 1.07% 8.04 
2008 1.46% 8.12 
 
 
 
We first separate the full sample into two sub-samples according to their repurchasing 
program status. Although two sub-samples are similar in firm size, firms who have completed 
their program averagely have higher book-to-market ratio. This result is consistent with existing 
literature that book-to-market ratio is a driving force of share repurchases. The differences in the 
fraction of target shares are insignificant. The abnormal announcement returns are also similar to 
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previous findings, suggesting that the property of share repurchases after the SEC disclosure rule 
does not change too much.  
The model predicts that the long-term price drifts are due to actual share repurchases, 
rather than an under-reaction to share repurchase announcements. Therefore, one should not 
observe the long-term abnormal returns following an announcement where no share is actually 
repurchased. We test this prediction by examining the abnormal return from a selected sample 
where firms only announce repurchases but do not actually repurchase shares. We use the 
calendar approach proposed by Fama (1998) to estimate the abnormal returns for one to four 
years around announcements of share repurchases. The results are reported in table 8. Different 
from existing literature, but consistent with the model prediction, there is no positive abnormal 
return following announcements.  The returns on a long-term buy and hold portfolio are no 
different between the periods before announcements and the periods after.   
 
Table 8 long-term price drift for firms do NOT actually repurchase shares 
This table reports the long-term price drift for firms who announced share repurchase from 2004 to 2008, but did not 
repurchase any shares after the announcements. The long-term price drift is measured by market excess return. We 
use Fama (1998) time calendar approach to compute market excess return by subtracting market return (CRSP 
weighted monthly average)  from stock monthly raw return.
 37
 Months are the number of month prior to or after a 
repurchasing announcement. ** represents 1% significant level. 
Months Prior # of obs. Post # of obs. Post-prior T-value 
12 -0.223% 6441 0.205% 10289 0.428%** -2.67 
24 0.108% 10975 0.167% 17584 0.059% -0.47 
36 0.240% 14057 0.129% 21462 -0.111% 0.96 
48 0.248% 15777 0.153% 23511 -0.095% 0.84 
 
 
                                                 
37
 Schultz (2003) shows that the long-run under (over) -performance is likely to be observed ex-post in an efficient 
market. This is so called pseudo market timing. We follow Fama (1998) time calendar approach to avoid this 
problem. The market excess return at month 24 is the mean of monthly returns from month 1 to 24 before an 
announcement for a prior-period excess return. The respective post-period excess return is measured from month 
1 to 24 after that announcement.  
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 The result in table 8 provides indirect support for the hypothesis H3. We test the H3 
directly by examining the abnormal returns and the timing of actual share repurchases. The 
model predicts that price stays high right after actual share repurchases, as if no information were 
released from actual share repurchases and investors do not update their reservation values. We 
estimate the monthly abnormal return with Fama (1998) approach and compute the average 
monthly return for the months with actual repurchases and without actual repurchases. Due to the 
limitation of the SEC filing requirement and the structure of Compustat data, we can only 
observe the frequency of actual share repurchases at quarterly level. The average monthly 
abnormal returns for repurchasing quarters and non-repurchasing quarters are reported in table 9, 
in the window from one to four years.  
 
Table 9 abnormal return and actual share repurchase 
This table reports the differences in abnormal returns between firms who announced but did not repurchase any 
shares and firms who announced and actually repurchased shares from 2004 to 2008. The abnormal returns are Alfas 
from regressing firms‘ monthly raw return on market return, firm size, and book-to-market ratio (Fama-French three 
factor model) in each period. Month is the number of months after a repurchasing announcement. ** represents 1% 
significant level.  
Months No_repur Repur No-repur - Repur T-value 
12 0.36% -0.10% 0.46%** 2.27 
24 0.39% -0.12% 0.51%** 3.16 
36 0.34% -0.17% 0.51%** 3.55 
48 0.24% -0.15% 0.49%** 3.68 
 
 
 The result looks striking at first glance. The abnormal returns in non-repurchasing 
quarters are significantly higher than ones in repurchasing quarters, directly opposite with the 
model prediction. This result, however, is consistent with the price support hypothesis that 
managers repurchase shares when the stock price is low. The negative market excess returns 
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reflect managers‘ ability in timing the market. The quarterly actual repurchase data is not 
suitable to test the immediate price reaction to share repurchases. With the trading level data 
from Hong Kong market, Brockman and Chung (2001) are able to examine the price behavior 
following actual share repurchases. Although they focus on managerial timing and the liquidity 
effects, they document that returns in repurchase periods are significantly higher than the ones in 
non-repurchase periods.
38
 Their results lend direct support for this heterogeneous expectation 
share repurchase model.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we investigate why firms repurchase shares. Although the undervaluation-
signaling hypothesis has been popular for years, the empirical evidence often is not consistent 
with the signaling hypothesis. Many researchers borrow the ideas from behavioral finance, and 
accept the irrational explanation that investors persistently under-react to repurchase 
announcements and make mistakes. Such an explanation, however, challenges the principle of 
market efficiency. It is not clear why rational investors do not arbitrage on such long-term 
abnormal returns.  
 In our model, investors are fully rational, but different from each other in that they hold 
different expectations about the firm‘s cash flows. That is, investors can hold different opinions 
about firm‘s future cash flows even though they observe the same market information. Thus, 
                                                 
38
 Brockman and Chung (2001), “Managerial timing and corporate liquidity: evidence from actual share 
repurchases,” the Journal of Financial Economics, 61, page 434, table 5. 
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they react differently to the same information conveyed in repurchase announcements. Each 
investor chooses the optimal trading strategy based on their reservation values, and the offered 
repurchasing prices. The managers‘ share repurchase decision maximizes each shareholder‘s 
utility in different ways. Pessimistic shareholders are able to tender their shares and gain a tender 
premium, while optimistic shareholders acquire more shares of future cash flows and a higher 
liquidation value of their share holdings. Any long-term price drift, following a share repurchase 
announcement, reflects the movement of the price along the investors‘ demand curve. Share 
repurchases are indeed ‗best choices‘ when the firm has excess capital and few investment 
opportunities. Our model is consistent with the top two reasons that managers responded to in a 
real world survey by Brav et al. (2005).
39
 
 In addition to providing a theory that is consistent with documented anomalies about 
share repurchases, this paper also presents other supportive empirical evidence. We find the 
likelihood that a firm will repurchase shares increases, as the divergence of investor opinion 
increases. This pattern holds consistent, even after controlling for the book-to-market ratio, firm 
size, past returns, and information asymmetry. We also document a positive relationship between 
the divergence of opinion and the announced target shares. There is no long-term abnormal 
return, if a firm only announces a repurchasing program but does not repurchase any stock. 
Overall, our evidence suggests that the heterogeneous expectation theory has incremental 
explanation power over other existing hypotheses.  
                                                 
39
 In responding the question ‘What factors might get your company to seriously consider repurchasing shares in 
the future?’,  managers rank (1) Market undervaluation of our stock and (2) Our company having extra 
cash/marketable securities the top two factors that affect the repurchasing decision. Managers also state that ‘We 
make repurchase decisions after our investment plans are Determined’. See Brav et al. (2005) for details. 
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 The model and the evidence presented in this paper mainly focus on a firm‘s share 
repurchase decision. However, like Dittmar and Thakor (2007), this paper provides an alternative 
explanation that can affect corporation decisions. The classic homogeneous assumption might 
not hold in a real managers‘ decision-making environment, so the heterogeneity assumption may 
be needed to understand manager and investor behavior. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
WHY DO FIRMS REPURCHASE SHARES? EVIDENCE FROM ACTUAL SHARE 
REPURCHASES  
 
In this paper, we provide new evidence to explain managers‘ motivation to repurchase 
shares by looking at their actual share repurchase activity. Existing literature focuses on the 
announcements of open market share repurchases (hereafter, repurchases) and largely ignores the 
managers‘ actual repurchasing activity. Both theoretical works and empirical tests often assume 
that managers repurchase shares after announcements. However, in practice, managers neither 
take their announcements as a commitment, nor do they always repurchase shares after 
announcements.
40
 We purport that in the absence of actual share repurchases, the explanatory 
power of previous studies may be diminished. 
We contribute to the existing literature by examining managers‘ actual share repurchase 
activity. We test whether these theoretical predictions hold when examining actual share 
repurchases. Specifically, we test the three hypotheses simultaneously: the information 
asymmetry hypothesis based on signaling theory, the excess capital distribution hypothesis based 
on agency theory, and the investor divergence of opinion hypothesis based on marginal-investor 
theory.  Overall, our results support the excess capital distribution and investor divergence of 
opinion hypotheses.  We find no significance evidence to support for information asymmetry 
hypothesis.  
                                                 
40
 Bamber (1987), Stephens and Weisbach (1998), and Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) document that 
managers not all managers repurchase share right after their announcements.  
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Developed by Bhattacharya (1979), Vermaelen (1984), Miller and Rock (1985), and Ofer 
and Thakor (1987), the information asymmetry hypothesis suggests that managers in better-
performing firms believe their stocks are undervalued by the market and consequently they use 
repurchase announcements as a signal to differentiate themselves from low-performing firms. 
Managers in firms with high levels of information asymmetry therefore have an incentive first to 
announce share repurchases, and then follow through and repurchase shares to make their 
announcements creditable.  
Jensen (1986), develops agency theory – upon which the excess capital distribution 
hypothesis is based. Researchers subscribing to this view purport that share repurchases reduce 
excess free cash flow, and therefore mitigate the potential over-investment problem. This 
hypothesis implies that firms with a large amount of cash and few growth opportunities should 
repurchase shares, and that following share repurchases, these firms should experience a 
decrease in the level of cash and free cash flow. 
Although empirical research provides some support for the information asymmetry and 
excess capital distribution hypotheses, these approaches fail to explain several anomalies, 
specifically, the documented long-term price drift and abnormal returns that occur subsequent to 
announcements of open market share repurchases. In an attempt to explain these anomalies, 
Huang and Thakor (2010), Blau et al. (2011), and Conlon, Fuller and Wang (2011) apply the 
investor heterogeneity hypothesis, where investors hold different opinions due to different prior 
beliefs or different information process models.  
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This approach suggests that investors draw different conclusions about the future, even 
when they have the same information (provided by managers) about the current state of world. It 
follows then that stock prices will be undervalued, as pessimistic investors, according to the 
marginal investor theory, determine stock prices, and they arrive at a lower expectation value for 
a firm than do optimistic investors. Within this hypothesis, the announcement of a share 
repurchases indicates that managers‘ view their stock as undervalued; it implies that the larger 
the divergence of investors‘ opinion, the more likely it is that managers not only make share 
repurchases but that they repurchase more shares.  
Following the research of Dittmar (2000) and Grullon and Michaely (2004), and using 
measures of actual share repurchases, we jointly test our predictions across these three 
hypotheses. Rather than focusing on repurchase announcements or assuming that managers 
actually repurchase share in the three years following an announcement, we examine the firm 
following actual share repurchases. We estimate the actual share repurchases with the 
methodology proposed by Fama and French (2001), Skinner (2008), and Huang and Thakor 
(2010) - this method allows us to observe directly whether managers repurchase shares and 
estimate the amount of shares they repurchased in a year.  
We use a direct measure of information asymmetry, Psi , and two indirect measures, the 
intangible asset ratio and fixed asset ratio,  to estimate the level of information asymmetry in a 
firm. We find that the firms who repurchase shares have less information asymmetry compared 
to a sample of firms who do not repurchase shares. Additionally, when restricting our 
examination to a sample of firms that repurchase, we find that firms with less information 
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asymmetry repurchase more shares. We fail to detect any significant decline in information 
asymmetry following actual share repurchases. Although our findings are contrary to the 
predictions of the information asymmetry hypothesis, they are consistent with Merton and Rock 
(1985) who purport that managers face adverse selection problem when they repurchase shares 
from market and they will therefore be reluctant to repurchase shares when information 
asymmetry is high.   
We find empirical support for an agency cost motivation for share repurchase programs – 
i.e. firms with large cash reserves that lack good investment opportunities. Our repurchasing 
sample firms have significantly higher levels of cash and free cash flow, and lower R&D 
expense than do non-repurchasing firms. We also find that firms with more cash and a higher 
level of free cash flow repurchase more shares. Our findings suggest that excess capital re-
distribution could be a motivation for managers to repurchase shares, as after actual share 
repurchases, the cash reserve declines significantly, both in the form of cash and free cash flow.  
We also find evidence consistent with the investor heterogeneity hypothesis. Following 
Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006), Hong and Stein (2007), and Garfinkel (2009), we use estimates 
from trading volume to estimate the divergence of opinion amongst a firm‘s investors. Our 
results suggest that the investors of repurchasing firms have higher divergence of opinion on 
their holding firm‘s value than the investors of non-repurchasing firms. The difference in 
divergence of opinion between repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms persists after 
controlling for firm characteristics. We also find that when a firm has higher divergence of 
opinion among its investors, managers tend to repurchase more shares in the following year. We 
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also document that the divergence of opinion is significantly higher in the year prior to actual 
share repurchase than the year in which a consecutive repurchasing program concludes.  
This paper is closely related to a survey completed by Brav et al. (2005) on the opinion of 
managers regarding share repurchases. Managers state that they repurchase shares because they 
believe their stock is undervalued – share repurchases provide a relatively high rate of return 
compared to other investment opportunities. Consistent with this view, we find that repurchasing 
firms have lower operating and R&D expenses; firms with lower profit margin and lower past-
year returns repurchase more shares. Our result suggests that managers repurchase shares when 
they hold more optimistic opinion on the firm value than pessimistic investors. For a mature firm 
with a large amount cash on hand but few growth opportunities, managers repurchase stocks 
from pessimistic shareholder for the best interests of optimistic, long-term shareholders. 
Different from ‗future cash flow‘ signaling, we argue that the announcement of repurchase signal 
only the managers‘ opinion on their stock price. There is no additional information about future 
cash flows that could (should) be released to public.  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: Section II briefly introduces the three 
hypotheses and reviews the actual share repurchase literature. Section III describes the 
methodology and variables used in our empirical test. Section IV presents the sample statistics 
and the properties of consecutive actual share repurchasing program. In section V, we test the 
three proposed hypotheses and examine how firms change following actual share repurchase. 
Section VI concludes the paper. 
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II. The Motivation of Share Repurchase and the Actual Share Repurchases  
2.1 The Motivation of Managers to Repurchase Shares 
Share repurchases, especially open market share repurchases, have been extensively 
examined in academic literature. Several explanations for managerial motivation to repurchase 
shares have been proposed by researchers, including the information asymmetry hypothesis 
based on signaling theory, the excess capital redistribution hypothesis based on agency theory, as 
well as other hypotheses focusing on capital structure optimization, acquisition deterrence, and 
dividends substitution.
41
  
Tests of these hypotheses focus primarily on the associated announcement effect. Dann 
(1981), Vermaelen (1981), and Comment and Jarrell (1991) all document significant stock price 
reaction to the announcement of share repurchases. More recently, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen (1995), Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000), and Peyer and Vermaelen 
(2009), find that share prices do not reach a new equilibrium immediately in response to these 
announcements, but tend to drift for at least three years. This long-term price drift and the related 
long-term abnormal returns both represent share repurchase anomalies, which serve to cast 
doubts on the explanatory power of traditional hypotheses. 
Recently, Huang and Thakor (2010), Conlon, Fuller and Wang (2011) and Blau et al. 
(2011)  apply the investor heterogeneity hypothesis to open market share repurchases in an 
attempt to explain long-term share repurchase anomalies. This hypothesis emphasizes the 
                                                 
41
 For information asymmetry hypothesis, see Bhattacharya (1979), Merton and Rock (1985), and Vermaelen 
(1981); for free-cash-flow hypothesis, see Morse (1980), Easterbrook (1984), and Jensen (1986). For a broad 
review on this literature, see also Dittmar (2000), Grullon and Ikenberry (2000), and Allen and Michaely (2003).  
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importance of actual share repurchases, rather than focusing on the announcements of 
repurchase.  
The investor divergence of opinion, which was introduced early in finance literature, is 
built upon the investor heterogeneity or the marginal-investor theory, where asset prices are 
determined by the marginal investors‘ opinion in the incomplete market (Keynes (1937), 
Williams (1956), Miller (1977), and Mayshar (1983)). With divergence of opinion, both 
optimistic and pessimistic investors are present in the market simultaneously. When managers 
offer to repurchase shares, only pessimistic shareholders choose to tender their shares, while 
optimistic shareholders choose to hold their shares and maintain their status as shareholders. 
After tendering, stock price reflects the ‗new‘ marginal shareholder‘s opinion. The updated stock 
price is higher than the price before tendering, since new marginal investors are slightly more 
optimistic than are tendering shareholders. The stock prices keep drifting upward as long as 
managers actually repurchase shares from the market. The opinion of pessimistic shareholders is 
not incorporated into the stock price because with short sale constraints, pessimistic shareholders 
who have just tendered their shares cannot short sell the stock.   
The investor divergence of opinion hypothesis suggests that managers repurchase shares 
for the best interests of long-term shareholders, since these shareholders (and managers) believe 
the stock is undervalued by pessimistic investors. The larger the divergences of opinion between 
optimistic and pessimistic investors, the more incentive managers have to repurchase shares. The 
announcements of share repurchase disclose managers‘ opinion on current stock price. Wealth is 
transferred from tendering shareholders to non-tendering shareholders as long as managers are 
 98 
 
not overly optimistic. Therefore, non-tendering shareholders earn long-term abnormal returns 
when managers continue to repurchase shares from the market.  
 
2.2 The Actual Share Repurchases 
Academic researchers customarily assume that managers repurchase shares after their 
announcement. However, speculation in the press suggests actual repurchase rates of only 30-40 
percent (For example, see WSJ ―Most buybacks are stated, not completed‖ March 7, 1995). 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998), and Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) suggest an 
actual repurchase rate of 70-80 percent at most. Bamber (1987) find that, immediately after the 
market crash in 1987, many firms announced a repurchase program, but most of them did not 
actually repurchase shares.  
Managers‘ actual share repurchasing activity and their managerial performance are 
closely related to actual share repurchases. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) first examine the 
actual share repurchase with proxies for changes in shares outstanding or treasury stock and 
dollars spent on reacquiring shares. They find that managers‘ actual share repurchase behavior is 
heavily affected by prior stock performance. Lie (2005) document that the operating 
performance improvement and the positive earnings announcement returns are limited to firms 
who actually repurchase shares; they argue that it is the actual repurchases, not announcements, 
predict future firm‘s performance improvements. Similarly, Blau et al. (2011) find that there is 
no long-term abnormal return from firms who only announce open market repurchases but 
actually do not reacquire shares.  
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Consistent evidences is also found in the Hong Kong and French markets, where detailed 
actual share repurchasing data is available at daily or intraday intervals. For example, in the 
Hong Kong market, Brockman and Chung (2001) document a positive relationship between 
stock price performance and actual share repurchases, and Zhang (2005) find that repurchasing 
firms, not announcing firms, earn 20 percent higher abnormal return than their matched sample 
firm counterparts. Using data from 352 French firms, Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) document 
that French firms repurchase shares at a price lower than the average trading price, as shares are 
repurchased after an observable decline in share price. They argue that there is no evidence that 
managers use private information to repurchase stock before the share price rises. 
 
III. Methodology  
3.1 Actual Share Repurchase 
Firms operating in the U.S. market do not disclose their actual share repurchase activity 
in detail (for example, on a daily basis). Neither the number of shares repurchased, nor the 
repurchasing price and time are made available to the public.
42
 Adding to the complexity of the 
situation, firms may issue new stocks after managers announce a repurchasing program, or they 
might re-distribute the repurchased stocks as compensation to executive managers or for the 
execution of employee options.  
                                                 
42
 Beginning in 2004, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC) required all U.S. listed firms to report share 
repurchase data in their quarterly reports, including the dollar value spent on the repurchase and the average 
repurchasing share price.  
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To estimate the number of actual shares repurchased, we adopt the methodology used by 
Fama and French (2001), Skinner (2008), and Huang and Thakor (2010) to measure the dollar 
value spent on actual share repurchases. Firms can use two techniques to repurchase shares: 
either the treasury stock method or the retiring stock method. In the treasury stock method, firms 
repurchase shares from the market and hold them as treasury stock in the book. Treasury stocks 
can be reissued to employees, or offered back to outside investors on the market. With the 
retirement stock method, firms repurchase and then retire shares from the market, which results 
in an immediate reduction in the number of shares outstanding.  
For firms using the treasury stock method, we measure for each fiscal year the dollar 
value spent on share repurchases for year t as the change in common treasury stock from year t-1 
to year t. We then estimate the number of shares actually repurchased by dividing the dollar 
amount with the share price at the end of fiscal year (Equation 3.1).
 43
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(3.1) 
If a firm has zero treasury stock in the current and prior year, we infer that the firm uses 
the retirement method to repurchase shares. We measure the dollar value spent on repurchases 
for year t as the difference between purchases and sales of common and preferred stock in year t. 
The actual number of shares repurchased in year t is calculated by dividing the dollar value spent 
on share repurchases with the end-of-fiscal-year stock price (Equation 3.2.). 
                                                 
43
 We also estimate the net changes of shares outstanding by dividing the dollar value with the middle stock price 
of the yearly highest and lowest during that fiscal year. We find the result is similar to the one estimated with the 
end of year stock price.  
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(3.2) 
We measure the actual change in shares outstanding, referred to as the actual share 
repurchases ratio, as the ratio of the actual shares repurchased during a year and the total shares 
outstanding at the beginning of that year (Equation 3.3).    
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3.2 Divergence of Opinion 
Investors trade with each other when they have a different valuation of the same asset 
(Morse (1980), Karpoff (1986), Bamber (1987), Kandel and Pearson (1995), and Chen, Hong 
and Stein (2001), Fama and French (2007)). More specifically, Varian and Michigan (1985) 
distinguish investor opinion from  information in a Bayesian framework. They argue that trading 
volume depends only on differences of opinion, even when investors receive different 
information, because the market price eventually adjusts to reveal all information in the economy 
and thus negates the value of unique information held by any single investor.  
Following Hong and Stein (2007) and Garfinkel (2009), we use the abnormal market 
adjusted turnover, ,i tAbto to measure divergence of opinion among investors. To avoid the less-
trading-frequency problem, we enhance their methodology by using weekly cumulative trading 
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volume rather than daily trading volume.
44
 The weekly market adjusted turnover, ,i tAbto , is firm 
i‘s trading volume during week t, divided by its shares outstanding during that same week, minus 
the ratio of the market‘s total weekly trading volume, ,m tVol , scaled by the market total shares 
outstanding, ,m tShrs , (Equation 3.4). The measure the degree of divergence of opinion is 
determined by the mean and median value of the weekly market adjusted turnover for each firm 
year. 
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(3.4) 
We also compute the standardized unexplained stock trading volume, ,i tSUV  (Garfinkel 
and Sokobin (2006) and Garfinkel (2009)) as an alternative measure of divergence of opinion.
 45
 
Standardized unexplained stock trading volume measures unexpected trading volume resulting 
from the impact of both liquidity demands and information. Unexpected trading volume is the 
residual volume ( ,i t ) from a regression of the firm‘s weekly trading volume on weekly signed 
absolutely returns (Equation 3.5): 
 , , , ,i t i i i t i i t i tVolume Ret Ret   
 
    ,    (3.5) 
                                                 
44
 Il-liquid stocks could have periods of low daily trading volume. The estimation from those extreme values can 
cause bias in estimates of divergence of opinion.  
45
 The dispersion of analyst forecasts is often used as a measure for divergence of opinion. However, under the 
assumption of heterogeneous expectations among investors, analysts’ opinion may not provide an accurate 
reflection of the true investors’ opinion. In addition, a lack of observations also limits the use of analyst forecast 
data.  
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The plus and minus superscripts on the absolute valued returns indicate the sign of weekly returns. The 
standardized unexplained trading volume is the yearly average of such residuals scaled by the standard deviation 
of residual (Equation 3.6), as: 
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3.3 Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry could cause investors to hold different valuations of a stock. We 
use three measures to estimate the level information asymmetry. First, we include a direct 
measure suggested by Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004). They purport that greater firm-specific 
variation in stock price implies that more information is impounded into the price and therefore 
lower levels of information asymmetry exists. This measure is also employed by Morck, Yeung 
and Yu (2000), Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004), Dittmar and Thakor (2007), Duarte et al. 
(2008), and Huang and Thakor (2010).  
The firm-specific variation, ,i tPsi , is defined as a natural log transformation (
2
2
1
ln( )
R
Psi
R

 ) of R-squares from the following regression:  
 , , , ,_ _i t i i i t i i t i tRet Ret Industry Ret market       , (3.7)  
The dependent variable ( ,i tRet ) is equal to the stock‘s cumulative weekly raw return, and 
the independent variables are industry- (defined as two-digital standard Industry Classification 
(SIC) code) and market-wide value-weighted weekly returns. The industry- and market-wide 
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weekly returns are value-weighted weekly stock return across industry and the market. Psi is an 
inverse measure of information asymmetry: a larger Psi reflects lower levels if information 
asymmetry.
46
  
 Two other measures of information asymmetry are used - a pair of opposite measures, the 
fixed asset ratio and the intangible asset ratio. Previous research suggest that firms with a higher 
proportion of fixed assets should be more transparent, since the uncertainty about the value of 
firm‘s assets is small and thus easy to value, while intangible assets typically are unrecognized 
and estimates of their fair values are not disclosed (Cañibano, Garcia-Ayuso and Sánchez (2000), 
Barth, Kasznik and McNichols (2001)). Relating assets and share repurchases, Barth and 
Kasznik (1999) find that firms with more intangible assets are more likely to announce share 
repurchase program and experience more positive post-announcement returns. Conversely, Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) and Dittmar and Thakor (2007) find that firms with high fixed asset ratio are 
more likely to use debt instead of equity financing. We measure the fixed asset ratio as net fixed 
assets divided by total assets (Dittmar and Thakor (2007)) and intangible asset ratio as the 
intangible assets other than goodwill scaled by total assets other than goodwill (Barth and 
Kasznik (1999)). 
 
3.4 Agency Problem 
                                                 
46
 For example, if a firm’s stock moving is perfectly correlated with the moving of market index, the R-square from 
equation 4.7 will be one. For such an R-square, the Psi approaches negative infinity. However, for such a firm, 
there is no firm-specific information incorporated into its price, as the price always moves with market index. Since 
no firm-specific information is revealed through its price, the firm has a high level of information asymmetry.  
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To evaluate the suppositions of the excess-capital-distribution hypothesis in relation to 
share repurchases, we capture each firms Cash  and free cash flows, FCFs . Following Dittmar 
(2000),  Cash  is defined as cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets, while FCFs is the 
ratio of net income before taxes plus depreciation and changes in deferred taxes and other 
deferred charges divided by total assets. As our third proxy for agency costs, we include, 
operating expenditures, OXD , defined as operating costs divided by total sales.  
 
3.5 Growth, Profitability, and other variables 
 Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995), Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(2000), and Von Eije and Megginson (2008), who demonstrate that a long-term price drift 
follows announcements of share repurchase, focus on firms with high book-to-market ratios. 
High book-to-market ratio firms are usually low growth firms. We include the Fama and French 
(1993) book-to-market ratio, bmratio  and the Research and Development expense, R& D , 
defined as the R&D spending divided by sales, to capture the firms‘ growth and new investment 
opportunity. 
47
 
 We control for other firm characteristics: to capture the firm size effect, we  use lnmk , 
measured as the natural log of the firm‘s market value; to capture the contrarian trading effect, 
we include the past year‘s average monthly return, Return ; and to capture the dividend 
substitution effect we include dividends paid per share, Dividend . Recent literature suggests that 
                                                 
47
 Refer to Fama and French (1993) for a detailed description of the bmratio measurement. The factors used to 
estimate the bmratio (Fama-French three-factor model) are from Kenneth R. French website, Data Library.  
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earnings are positively related to a firms‘ payout policy (Skinner (2008)), therefore we include 
profit margin, PM , defined as net income divided by sales, to measure the firms‘ profitability. 
Variables and their definitions are listed in table 1.  
 
Table 1 Definition of variables 
This table defines the variables used in this paper.  
Variables Definition 
Ln(MV) Nature log of the market capitalization 
AT Total asset 
Bmratio Fama and French (1993) book-to-market ratio 
Debtratio A ratio of long-term debt to total asset 
FixedAsset A ratio of fixed asset to total asset 
IntanAsset A ratio of intangible asset to total asset 
Psi The residual of weekly return regressed on market and industry return 
Cash Cash and cash equivalent  
FCF Free cash flow 
OXD Operation cost divided by sales 
R&D Research & Development cost divided by sales 
PM Profit margin (net income divided by sales) 
Return Cumulative annual stock return 
Dividend Total dividends pay per share 
Abto_mean The mean of abnormal turnover 
Abto_median The median of abnormal turnover 
SUV_mean The mean of standardized unexplained volume 
SUV_median The median of standardized unexplained volume 
 
 
 
IV. Sample Selection and the Properties of Actual Share Repurchases 
4.1 Data Sources and Sample selection  
To compute the actual share repurchase, we collect yearly treasury stock, and purchases 
and sales of common stock from the Compustat annual database. The fiscal-year-end and the 
fiscal-year highest and lowest stock price are also collected from Compustat. To compute the 
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divergence of opinion measures Abto and SUV , we collect stock daily trading volumes and 
returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and aggregate them into calendar 
weeks to obtain the cumulative weekly trading volume and return. To compute the information 
asymmetry measure, Psi , we collect daily stock price and the weighted-average Standard & 
Poor‘s 500 index from CRSP. The weekly return is the cumulative return in each calendar week. 
The industry average return is the cumulative return in each calendar week based on two-digit 
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code. We collect each firm‘s other characteristics: total 
assets, book value of asset, long-term debt, fixed assets, intangible assets, cash and cash 
equivalent, sales, net income, operation costs, research & development expense, tax and other 
deferred items, dividends, and shares outstanding from Compustat annual data.  
Our repurchase and non-repurchase pooled sample spans the period from 1991 to 2009. 
We require that each firm be U.S. firm listed on the NYSE, Amex or NASDAQ, have CRSP and 
Compustat data available, and have a fiscal-year-end stock price higher than $5. We also exclude 
observations with negative total assets. We delete outlier observations, specifically, firms with a 
book-to-market ratio less than 1 percent or greater than 99 percent percentile of the total 
population and firms with negative profit margins (about 2% of total population). 
 
4.2 Actual Share Repurchase  
 As in Skinner (2008), a firm-year is designated as an actual share repurchasing year only 
if the actual share repurchase ratio is positive. The actual share repurchase ratio is estimated by 
dividing the dollar value spent on actual repurchases with both the fiscal-year-end stock price 
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and the middle of fiscal-year highest and lowest stock price. The distribution of actual share 
repurchases is reported in Panel A, Table 2. There are about 40% of total observations having 
less than 1% actual share repurchase ratio. Only around 5% actual share repurchases are greater 
than 10% of total shares outstanding.  
In Panel B, we report the time-series trend of share repurchase from 1991 to 2009. Most 
firms repurchase 1% to 2% of their shares per year, with a median value of 1% and a mean value 
of 2.3%. The actual share repurchase ratio estimated from the fiscal-year-end stock price and the 
middle of fiscal-year highest and lowest price are similar.
 48
  In the later studies, we use the 
actual share repurchase ratio estimated from fiscal-year-end stock price only.  
We also observe two significant peaks in the number of firms who has actively engaged 
in actual share repurchase during our sample period. The first peak is around 1998/1999, during 
the early stage of the Internet (Dot-Com) bubble. The second peak is in 2008, which marks the 
beginning of the recent financial crisis. Not only there are more firms repurchase shares during 
these two peak periods, but firms on average repurchase more shares. These findings are 
consistent with the result of Dittmar and Dittmar (2004) that the aggregate share repurchases are 
affected by the business cycle. 
 
 4.3 The consecutive actual share repurchases  
                                                 
48
 The net share repurchases estimated from fiscal-year end price are slightly upward biased relative to the ones 
estimated from middle-price. This upward bias suggests that the stock price drops in the year the firm actually 
repurchases shares. We run the tests based on net share repurchase estimated from midpoint price – the average 
price of the year highest and lowest price, the results are not significantly different.  
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Not all managers actively repurchase shares after their announcements of share 
repurchase. Lie (2005) and Blau et al. (2011) document that there are firms do not repurchase 
any shares after the announcements. Furthermore, Lie (2005) find that both the operating 
performance improvement and the positive earnings announcement returns are limited to those 
firms that actually repurchase shares. Blau et al. (2011) find that the long-term abnormal returns 
following repurchasing announcements disappear if firms do not actually repurchase shares. Lie 
(2005) suggest that it is the actual repurchase, not the announcement, predict future performance 
improvements.  
Indeed, the actual share repurchase could be much smaller, even though managers 
actively repurchase shares after announcement. For firms using treasury stock method, managers 
could re-issue the treasury stock at the same year or one year later when they repurchase shares. 
Firms could also issue new shares on the market. The actual number of shares repurchased is 
offset by the new issued shares.  
To examine how the actual share repurchases affect the firm‘s characteristics, we limit 
our repurchasing sample for firm-year observations with significant actual share repurchase 
(greater than 1 percent of shares outstanding), which covers about 60 percent of our full actual 
repurchasing sample. In Table 3, we report t statistics of the sample categorized by the year and 
the repurchasing program. In Panel A, we report how frequently a firm has significant share 
repurchase. About 27 percent of firms repurchase more than 1 percent of shares outstanding only 
once in our 19-year sample period, from 1991 to 2009. About 18 percent and 13 percent of firms 
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repurchase significant amount of shares twice or three times in our sample period respectively. 
The low frequency of share repurchase suggests that firms repurchase shares discontinuously.  
 
Table 2 Statistics of firms‘ net share repurchases 
This table reports the distribution of net share repurchases, which is defined as the number of 
shares a firm repurchased divided by the firm‘s shares outstanding in a given fiscal year. We 
following Fama and French (2001), Skinner (2008), and Huang and Thakor (2010) to compute 
the net share repurchases. The net shares repurchased is estimated in the increase in common 
treasury stock divided by stock price, if the firm uses the treasury stock method for repurchases; 
otherwise the net shares repurchased is the difference between stock purchases and stock 
issuances divided by stock price. Since firms often continuously repurchase shares from market 
at market price, we estimate the average repurchasing price by two proxies, the fiscal year 
closing price and the midpoint of year-high and –low price.49 The net share repurchased ratio is 
the number of net shares repurchased divided by shares outstanding.  
 
 
Panel A the distribution of actual share repurchase by firm-year 
Panel A reports distribution of the net repurchase ratio. Close and Midpoint are ratio estimated 
by fiscal year closing stock price and middle of year-high and –low stock price.  
Percentile 1% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99% 
Close .00157% .0176% .0517% .297% 1.3% 3.6% 7.5% 10.9% 22.7% 
Midpoint .00162% .0176% .0505% .282% 1.2% 3.4% 6.7% 9.4% 18.5% 
 
 
Panel B actual share repurchase from 1991 to 2009 
Panel B reports the trend of share repurchase from 1991 to 2009. N is the number of firms that 
repurchased shares in that year. We compute the repurchase ratio with average repurchasing 
price based on fiscal-year end price and the middle of fiscal-year high and low price. Since these 
two estimations are very close, in later tables we reports the results based on fiscal year closing 
price only. 
  
Estimated by fiscal-year closing 
price 
Estimated by fiscal-year middle price 
Year N mean median max min mean median max min 
1991 635 2.12% 0.66% 71.01% 0.00% 2.07% 0.69% 67.40% 0.00% 
1992 666 2.14% 0.83% 39.87% 0.00% 2.00% 0.77% 33.55% 0.00% 
1993 768 1.78% 0.62% 42.91% 0.00% 1.70% 0.62% 39.78% 0.00% 
                                                 
49
 As managers usually repurchase shares when price is relatively low, our estimations are downward biased. The 
real net shares repurchased would be slightly higher.  
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1994 984 2.18% 0.91% 36.11% 0.00% 1.96% 0.81% 32.14% 0.00% 
1995 1001 1.92% 0.89% 48.25% 0.00% 1.93% 0.91% 40.53% 0.00% 
1996 1138 2.36% 1.07% 35.93% 0.00% 2.24% 1.01% 51.22% 0.00% 
1997 1303 2.36% 1.07% 51.60% 0.00% 2.32% 1.12% 43.83% 0.00% 
1998 1545 3.58% 1.85% 65.84% 0.00% 2.90% 1.55% 47.23% 0.00% 
1999 1445 4.47% 2.29% 90.93% 0.00% 3.75% 1.99% 57.60% 0.00% 
2000 1263 4.28% 2.18% 67.56% 0.00% 3.50% 1.87% 50.71% 0.00% 
2001 1044 2.34% 0.98% 67.84% 0.00% 2.09% 0.92% 62.84% 0.00% 
2002 1003 2.81% 1.26% 77.28% 0.00% 2.32% 1.08% 76.46% 0.00% 
2003 918 1.92% 0.96% 33.18% 0.00% 2.13% 1.13% 29.30% 0.00% 
2004 874 2.23% 1.14% 24.74% 0.00% 2.28% 1.18% 25.60% 0.00% 
2005 976 2.85% 1.69% 37.83% 0.00% 2.84% 1.71% 29.39% 0.00% 
2006 1038 2.79% 1.71% 38.82% 0.00% 2.77% 1.67% 36.86% 0.00% 
2007 1093 3.86% 2.05% 86.13% 0.00% 3.33% 1.91% 75.38% 0.00% 
2008 1195 5.55% 3.07% 91.98% 0.00% 3.64% 2.29% 51.87% 0.00% 
2009 730 1.86% 0.66% 25.71% 0.00% 2.00% 0.81% 23.02% 0.00% 
 
 
 
We categorize the discontinuous actual share repurchase activities into different 
repurchasing programs according to the consecutive repurchasing years. We define the number 
of consecutive repurchasing year as following: the number of years a firm continuously 
repurchases shares more than 1 percent per year without interruption. For example, if a firm 
repurchases 1 percent of shares from 2002 to 2004 each year and does not have significant share 
repurchase in 2005, the number of consecutive repurchasing years of this program is three. With 
this definition, a firm could have multiple repurchasing programs in our sample period, and each 
program could have different consecutive repurchasing years.  
It is important to note that this definition does not guarantee that the first year of a 
consecutive repurchasing program is the year of or the year following a repurchasing 
announcement. In practice, managers do not commit to repurchase shares immediately following 
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an announcement – they have the option to postpone or cancel the actual repurchase plan. 
However, this definition has a distinct advantage in that it allows us to examine the effects of a 
series of actual share repurchases on a firm following a significant level of share repurchases.  
In our sample, 49 percent of consecutive repurchasing program observations continue for 
only one year, 22 percent of significant repurchasing years belong to a two-year program, and 11 
percent are part of a three-year program. As the number of consecutive years increases, the 
number of observations drops quickly. Only few firms (less than .5 percent) continuously 
repurchase shares for more than 10 years. Although the repurchasing programs are different in 
their consecutive year, the average shares repurchased per year are very similar across different 
programs, with the mean of share repurchase per year at 3 percent with a median of 2.5 percent. 
Detailed results are reported in Table 3, Panel B.   
 
 
Table 3 repurchase frequencies and consecutively repurchases 
This table reports the behavior of firms share repurchases. Showup is the number a firm being 
observed in our net repurchasing sample. Firm often repurchase shares consecutively. We 
categorize the consecutively repurchase by the number of uninterrupted repurchasing years. The 
mean and median of repurchase per firm-year and the sum of total repurchase during the 
uninterrupted sequence are reported.  
 
Panel A   Panel B  
Frequency   Percentage Shares Repurchased 
Occurrence N (firms) % of total  Consecutive Years  obs. %  mean median 
1 1399 27.60%  1 4147 48.91% 3.02% 3.02% 
2 939 18.53%  2 1893 22.33% 2.97% 2.97% 
3 675 13.32%  3 967 11.41% 3.03% 2.32% 
4 512 10.10%  4 543 6.40% 2.91% 2.29% 
5 368 7.26%  5 350 4.13% 3.09% 2.38% 
6 245 4.83%  6 161 1.90% 3.32% 2.50% 
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7 250 4.93%  7 119 1.40% 3.58% 2.66% 
8 141 2.78%  8 88 1.04% 2.66% 1.94% 
9 136 2.68%  9 60 0.71% 2.58% 2.00% 
10 117 2.31%  10 45 0.53% 2.93% 2.11% 
11 93 1.84%  11 35 0.41% 2.65% 1.64% 
12 60 1.18%  12 18 0.21% 2.60% 1.76% 
13 44 0.87%  13 17 0.20% 2.43% 1.88% 
14 31 0.61%  14 10 0.12% 2.50% 1.95% 
15 20 0.39%  15 5 0.06% 2.15% 1.84% 
16 17 0.34%  16 9 0.11% 3.00% 2.18% 
17 13 0.26%  17 7 0.08% 2.56% 2.17% 
18 7 0.14%  18 3 0.04% 2.82% 2.26% 
19 1 0.02%  19 1 0.01% 3.16% 1.95% 
 
 
V. Empirical Results 
5.1 The difference between repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms 
Before we investigate how firms change after actual share repurchases, we examine how 
repurchasing firms differ from non-repurchasing firms. We first construct two comparable 
samples of repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms. For each year in our sample (1993 – 2007), 
firms are identified as a non-repurchasing firm if they do not repurchase at least 1 percent of 
outstanding shares in a five-year window (two-years prior to and following the current year). 
Firms are designated as repurchasing firms if they repurchases more than 1 percent of shares 
outstanding in the current year and have positive actual repurchase (with a sum of three-year 
actual share repurchase greater than zero) in a three-year window (one-year before and one-year 
after). This classification yields 6,911 non-repurchasing firm-years and 3,356 repurchasing firm-
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year. All variables are measured at the beginning of each fiscal year. We report the differences 
between repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms in table 4. 
 
Table 4: Firm characteristics between repurchase firm and non-repurchase firm 
This table reports the differences between repurchase and non-repurchase firms. For each year, if 
a firm does not repurchase any shares in a five years window (two-year before and two-year 
after) and have data available across the window, we identify the firm as a non-repurchasing 
firm. We identify a firm as repurchasing firm if it repurchases more than 1% shares outstanding 
in that year and has total positive net repurchases in a three-year window (one-year before and 
one-year after). The sample covers from 1993 to 2007, including 6911 non-repurchasing firm-
year and 3356 repurchasing firm-year. All variables are measured at the beginning of each fiscal 
year. Student T-test is conducted to compare the means of two samples. **, * represent 1% and 
5% levels of significance, respectively.  
 
Variable Non-repurchase Repurchase Non-Repur - 
Repur N 6911 3356 
Ln(MV) 12.1917 13.2010 -30.80*** 
AT 1128.9 2592.1 -16.95*** 
Bmratio 0.6240 0.5847 5.52*** 
Debtratio 0.1710 0.1484 7.50*** 
FixedAsset 0.3026 0.2612 9.94*** 
IntanAsset 0.0994 0.1241 -8.26*** 
Psi -2.5118 -2.0748 -19.60*** 
Cash 0.1441 0.1524 -3.08*** 
FCF 0.0746 0.1337 -25.31*** 
OXD 0.9328 0.8407 16.07*** 
R&D 0.1269 0.0574 10.14*** 
PM 0.0345 0.0507 -13.78*** 
Return 1.1963 1.1363 6.32*** 
Dividend 0.2096 0.2954 -8.68*** 
Abto_mean 0.3578 0.4055 -8.13*** 
Abto_median 0.3684 0.4082 -6.71*** 
SUV_mean 0.0009 0.0010 -1.75* 
SUV_median -0.2236 -0.2063 -9.59*** 
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Consistent with the findings in Barth and Kasznik (1999), Rajan and Zingales (1995), and 
Dittmar and Thakor (2007), we find significance differences between the repurchasing firms and 
non-repurchasing firms. Repurchasing firms are larger, have more total assets, smaller debt 
ratios, higher intangible asset ratios and lower fixed asset ratios.  
These results are consistent with the excess cash flow hypothesis and its underlying basis 
in agency theory. The repurchasing firms have substantially more cash and free cash flow than 
non-repurchasing firms, but less operating cost and R&D expenses. The presence of large cash 
reserves with  small operating costs in the share repurchasing sample suggests that managers in 
those firms do not intend to use ‗free cash flows‘ to ‗build their own empire‘ (Jensen (1986)), but 
to distribute the cash back to shareholders.  
The lower R&D expense is also consistent with the response of managers in Brav et al. 
(2005)‘s survey that managers, without better projects to pursue, consider a ‗share repurchase as 
a good investment opportunity‘. Conversely, repurchasing firms have a higher profit margin than 
non-repurchasing firms, but experience lower stock returns. This is consistent with the 
managerial opinion suggested by Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995), Grullon and 
Michaely (2004), and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009)that undervaluation is the most important 
motivation for them to repurchase shares.  
Consistent with our heterogeneous expectation hypothesis, repurchasing firms have 
higher divergence of opinion, measured by four proxies from trading volume. The abnormal 
turnover, after controlling for market-wide and industry-wide variance, is higher for 
repurchasing firms at both the mean and the median. The standardized unexplained trading 
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volume after controlling for the effect of abnormal return is also higher for repurchasing firms at 
both mean and median. 
However, the evidence does seem to support the information asymmetry hypothesis 
proposed by Vermaelen (1981). The higher intangible asset ratio but lower fixed asset ratio in 
share repurchasing sample, together with the higher value of Psi , seems to contradict the 
traditional argument of the signaling hypothesis. Repurchasing firms also pay, on average, more 
dividends per share than non-repurchasing firms, which do not support the dividends / share 
repurchase substitution hypothesis.  
Overall, the comparison between repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms supports the 
heterogeneous expectation and the excess cash flow hypotheses, as its results are consistent with 
the managers‘ ‗better investment opportunity‘ and ‗undervaluation‘ motivation. The result, 
however, fail to support the information asymmetry hypothesis.  
We then focus on the difference of divergence of opinion between these two samples 
after controlling for firms‘ characteristics. The results are reported in table 5. The dependent 
variable is abnormal turnover, while Repurchase is a dummy variable, which equals one if an 
observation is a repurchasing firm-year. We run four regression models while controlling for 
book-to-market ratio effect, information asymmetry effect, and excess cash flow effect. Overall, 
the results are consistent with the heterogeneous expectation hypothesis. Divergence of opinion 
is consistently and statistically significantly higher for the repurchasing firms.  
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Table 5 Difference of Divergence of opinion after controlling other factors 
This table uses the sample as in table 4. The dependent variable is the Abto_mean, a proxy for 
divergence of opinion. Repurchase is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm repurchases 
shares during the fiscal year. All other independent variables are measured at the beginning of 
each fiscal year. **, * represent 1% and 5% levels of significance, respectively, after controlling 
for heteroscedasticity. 
 
 
 Simple model Info. model Agency Model Full-factor model 
 Co-eff T-value Co-eff T-value Co-eff T-value Co-eff T-value 
Repurchase 0.1179 4.10** 0.0281 3.80** 0.0258 4.14** 0.0337 3.24** 
Ln(MV) 0.0198 4.39** 0.0136 4.83** 0.0212 9.32** 0.0097 2.52* 
AT 0.0000 0.11 0.0000 1.14 0.0000 0.67 0.0000 2.30* 
Bmratio 0.0072 0.85 0.0044 0.42 0.0150 1.71 0.0052 0.34 
Debtratio -.0356 -1.93     -.0577 -1.55 
FixedAsset   -.0269 -1.54   -.0077 -0.23 
IntanAsset   0.1843 7.32**   0.3184 7.86** 
Psi   0.0025 0.71   0.0015 0.29 
Cash     0.0408 2.30* 0.1275 3.81** 
FCF     0.0334 1.12 0.1046 2.17* 
OXD     0.0719 3.79** 0.1123 3.58** 
PM     0.0641 3.49** 0.0621 2.20* 
Dividend     -.0116 -1.97* -.0157 -1.09 
Return       -.0361 -3.95** 
Intercept 0.1179 4.10** 0.1847 4.48** 0.0183 0.50 0.1208 1.74 
 
 
We find that the intangible asset ratio is significantly positively related with divergence 
of opinion, which suggests that the intangible assets could be a potential reason why investors 
hold different opinions on firm value. However, the information asymmetry variable, Psi , is 
uncorrelated with divergence of opinion. This result is consistent with Varian and Michigan 
(1985)‘s theory that the divergence of opinion measure, abnormal turnover, is unaffected with 
information asymmetry.  
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5.2 The actual shares repurchased and the divergence of opinion  
We then restrict our examination to the sample with firms who actually repurchase 
shares. The heterogeneous expectation hypothesis suggests that managers repurchase shares 
because they hold higher evaluation on the firm than do pessimistic investors, the higher the 
divergence of opinion, the larger the firm is undervalued from the point of managers‘ view, and 
thus, the more shares managers are willing to repurchase from those pessimistic shareholders.  
In this section, we examine the relationship between the actual share repurchase and the 
level of divergence of opinion. The sample is same as the one used in Table 4, but exclude the 
non-repurchasing firms. The results are reported in Table 6. The dependent variable is the actual 
share repurchase ratio during a fiscal year and all independent variables are measured at the 
beginning of each year.  
The results are consistent across four models. When the divergence of opinion is higher, 
the managers repurchase more shares during the year. Consistent with pervious findings, the 
firms with higher book-to-market ratio, more cash and free cash flows, or larger negative returns, 
repurchase more shares. Firms that have lower profitability or already paid dividends in last year 
repurchase fewer amounts of shares. More strikingly, we find firms with less information 
asymmetry problem repurchase more shares, in both the information asymmetry model and the 
full-factor model. The result is again contradict with the information asymmetry hypothesis, but 
is consistent with the Merton and Rock (1985) that, with high information asymmetry, managers 
face the adverse selection problem when they repurchase shares, and thus, will be less likely to 
repurchase shares.   
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Table 6 Actual Share Repurchase and Divergence of Opinion 
This table examines the relationship between the divergence of opinion and the amount of actual 
shares repurchased in a year. The sample is same as the one in table 4. The dependent variable is 
the actual net share repurchase during the fiscal year. All independent variables are measured at 
the beginning of repurchasing fiscal year. **, * represent 1% and 5% levels of significance, 
respectively.  
 Simple model Info. model Agency Model Overall 
 Co-eff T-value Co-eff T-value Co-eff T-value Co-eff T-value 
Abto_mean 0.0097 5.70** 0.0088 4.57** 0.0094 4.15** 0.0053 2.05* 
Ln(MV) 0.0066 16.68** 0.0054 10.84** 0.0057 10.24** 0.0045 6.56** 
AT -.0006 -4.86** -.0008 -5.27** -.0004 -2.29* -.0003 -1.46 
Bmratio 0.0191 12.21** 0.0135 7.19** 0.0287 12.25** 0.0233 8.38** 
Debtratio -.0298 -8.72**     -.0068 -1.02 
FixedAsset   -.0296 -9.59**   -.0093 -1.57 
IntanAsset   -.0051 -1.14   0.0050 0.68 
Psi   0.0053 8.36**   0.0056 5.90** 
Cash     0.0304 7.14** 0.0209 3.47** 
CF     0.1064 15.96** 0.1146 13.48** 
OXD     -.0241 -5.05** -.0197 -3.50** 
PM     -.0281 -6.82** -.0176 -3.49** 
Dividend     -.0022 -0.97 -.0075 -2.93** 
Return       -.0093 -5.68** 
Intercept -.0763 -14.33 -.0410 -5.54** -.0679 -7.40** -.0253 -2.04* 
 
 
 
5.3 The change in firms after actual share repurchases  
In this section, we focus on changes experienced firms subsequent to actual share 
repurchasing programs. To quantify changes around a repurchasing program, we first identify 
each of the repurchasing programs for a given firm. A consecutive repurchasing program is 
defined in section 4.3. We collect the repurchasing programs with one, two, and three 
consecutive repurchasing years, which are labeled as S1, S2, and S3 respectively. We then 
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compare the firms‘ characteristics at the beginning of a repurchasing program (pre-) and one year 
after the end of the repurchasing program (post-).  The results are reported in table 7. 
 
 
Table 7 changes of firms‘ characteristics pre- and post- a continuous share repurchase program 
This table reports the changes of firms‘ characteristics at the year before and the year after an 
uninterrupted repurchase program. S1, S2, and S3 represent a repurchase program continues for 
one, two, and three years without interruption. Post is one year following the repurchase 
program; while pre is one year pre to the repurchase program. **, * represent 1% and 5% levels 
of significance, respectively, after controlling for heteroscedasticity. 
 
 S1 S2 S3 
Variable Post- Pre- T-value Post- Pre- T-value Post- Pre- T-
value 
Abto 0.4473 0.4829 -2.82** 0.4397 0.5532 -5.48** 0.4153 0.4673 -2.33* 
Abto_m 0.4819 0.5181 -2.52* 0.4724 0.5842 -4.78** 0.4095 0.5071 -2.92* 
Ln(MV) 12.358 12.452 -2.01* 12.594 12.698 -1.50 12.882 12.876 0.06 
AT 2365.4 1958.7 1.86 2289.8 1967.0 1.46 2598.8 1875.8 1.98* 
Bmratio 0.6394 0.5916 4.47** 0.6809 0.5825 6.22** 0.6961 0.5796 5.18** 
Debtratio 0.1716 0.1591 2.76** 0.1786 0.1469 4.95** 0.1611 0.1476 1.52 
FixedAsset 0.2801 0.2687 1.80 0.2736 0.2570 1.82 0.2692 0.2514 1.38 
IntanAsset 0.1224 0.1196 0.64 0.1361 0.1255 1.58 0.1320 0.1236 0.87 
Psi -2.5315 -2.5583 0.79 -2.4277 -2.2848 -2.94** -2.296 -2.373 1.19 
Cash 0.1544 0.1783 -4.77** 0.1395 0.1745 -5.08** 0.1448 0.1682 -2.39* 
FCF 0.0575 0.0822 -5.96** 0.0621 0.1071 -7.81** 0.0757 0.1152 -
5.91** 
OXD 0.9205 0.9215 -0.08 0.8981 0.8743 1.94 0.8876 0.8581 2.07* 
R&D 0.1133 0.1385 -1.73 0.0989 0.0888 0.77 0.0855 0.0802 0.32 
PM -0.0458 -0.0427 -0.25 -0.0204 0.0125 -2.19* -.0026 .0272 -1.87 
Return 1.2089 1.1424 4.19** 1.1972 1.1916 0.25 1.2138 1.2412 -0.87 
Dividend 1.2089 1.1424 4.19** 0.2539 0.2362 0.73 0.2984 0.2474 1.73 
 
 
Consistent with the heterogeneous expectation hypothesis, the divergence of opinion 
shifts downward after an actual share repurchase program. Both the mean and the median of 
abnormal turnover (Abto and Abto_m) decrease. The decreases in abnormal turnover are 
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statistically significant and consistent across all three types of consecutive repurchasing 
programs. The cash and free cash flow also reduce dramatically in all three types of repurchasing 
programs. The decreasing in cash could be a direct result of share repurchases. Managers invest 
the excess cash into share repurchases as there are no other better investment opportunities (Brav 
et al. (2005)). The reduction in cash is also consistent with the excess cash distribution 
hypothesis.  
More interestingly, we find that the book-to-market ratio increases, rather than decrease, 
after the actual share repurchase programs. In all three types of repurchasing programs, the 
firms‘ book-to-market ratio increases significantly in the year after the repurchasing program 
comparing to its value at the beginning of the program. This result suggests that the high book-
to-market ratio might not be the result rather than the force that driving managers to repurchase 
shares. We also document a significant increase in debt ratio, which suggests that equity value 
decreases after significant amount of cash is paid out.
50
  
This change in information asymmetry of the firm is, again, failed to support the 
signaling hypothesis.  In in type S1 and S3 share repurchasing programs, the information 
asymmetry measures do not change significantly after share repurchases.  More strikingly, the 
information asymmetry increases after the type 2 repurchasing program. The profit margin 
represents the same pattern as information asymmetry: insignificant changes in type 1 and 3 
programs and decrease in type 2 programs, which cast doubt on the argument that share 
                                                 
50
 The managers can also borrow money to repurchase shares. However, this strategy brings a large agency costs 
between shareholders and debt holders. The debt issuers often restrict the managers’ flexibility of using debt to 
finance the net cash payout through either dividends or share repurchases. 
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repurchase announcements signal better future performance. This result, however, is consistent 
with Grullon and Michaely (2004), who document no operating performance increase following 
open market repurchase announcement.  
We then focus on the changes of divergence of opinion among the investors. The investor 
heterogeneous expectation hypothesis predicts that managers repurchase shares due to the high 
divergence of opinion; after share repurchases, only the optimistic shareholders hold the stocks; 
and thus the stock price increases as the divergence of opinion decreases. We examine the 
changes in divergence of opinion after controlling for other firm characteristics. The sample 
contains the observations from the year at the beginning of the repurchasing program and one 
year after the end of a program. We then run the regression where the dependent variable is the 
divergence of opinion (Abto_m). We set a dummy variable, Pre, which equals one if the 
observation is from the year at the beginning of a repurchasing program.  
 
 
Table 8 changes of divergence of opinion before and after an uninterrupted repurchasing 
program 
This table reports the changes of divergence of opinion at one year before and one year after an 
uninterrupted repurchasing program after controlling for firm characteristics. The dependent 
variable is the divergence of opinion, Abto_mean. S1, S2, and S3 represent a repurchase program 
continues for one, two, and three years without interruption. Pre is a dummy variable is the 
variable is observed one year before share repurchase, otherwise equals zero. Other variables are 
measured each year respectively. **, * represent 1% and 5% levels of significance, respectively, 
after controlling for heteroscedasticity. 
 S1 S2 S3 
 Co-eff T-value Co-eff T-value Co-eff T-value 
Pre 0.0252 2.67** 0.0404 2.22* 0.0539 2.09* 
Ln(MV) 0.0508 10.48 0.0620 11.67** 0.0208 2.44* 
Bmratio 0.0462 2.31* 0.0647 3.07** -.0023 -.07 
IntanAsset 0.3798 7.39** 0.4036 7.75** 0.1949 2.42* 
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Psi -.0287 -3.77** -.0371 -4.78** -.0213 -1.66 
Cash 0.1243 2.70** 0.2036 4.10** 0.0878 1.13 
FCF -.0092 -.15 0.0197 0.29 0.1467 1.17 
PM 0.1138 3.78** 0.1361 3.96** 0.1029 1.25 
OXD 0.0994 3.20** 0.1334 3.60** 0.1018 1.22 
Dividend 0.0087 1.22 0.0380 2.54* -.0279 -.93 
Return -.0902 -6.95** -.1359 -9.07** -.0980 -4.27** 
Intercept -.3292 -4.03** -.4527 -4.98** 0.1325 0.85 
 
 
 
The result is reported in table 8. Consistent with the heterogeneous expectation 
hypothesis, the divergence of opinion is larger for observations from the year at the beginning of 
repurchasing program. As the number of consecutive year increases, the changes in divergence 
of opinion decrease, suggesting that the effects of actual share repurchases on the divergence of 
opinion decrease. Such decreasing effect is consistent with the insignificant return increases after 
type 2 and 3 repurchasing program in Table 7, and therefore, support the heterogeneous 
expectation hypothesis that stock price increases as the divergence of opinion decreases.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, we jointly test three hypotheses in an attempt to explain the motivation of 
managers to initiate share repurchase programs: the information asymmetry hypothesis based on 
signaling theory, the excess capital distribution hypothesis based on agency theory, and the 
investor divergence of opinion hypothesis based on marginal-investor theory. Overall, our results 
support the agency and investor divergence of opinion hypotheses. We do not find significant 
evidence in support of the information asymmetry hypothesis.  
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 We test these three hypotheses by looking at the firms‘ actual share repurchase - our 
research differs from past empirical works, which traditionally focuses on the announcement 
effect of share repurchase and assume managers will repurchase shares after their announcement. 
We select our repurchasing sample for firms with yearly actual share repurchase of more than 1 
percent of shares outstanding. Amongst them, more than 72 percent of firms repurchase more 
than once from 1991 to 2009. We also find that firms choose to execute their repurchasing 
programs over a different number of consecutive years, and firms on average repurchase 3 
percent of shares outstanding each year. Overall, approximately 50 percent of our net share 
repurchasing programs last for only one year and 40 percent of repurchasing programs proceed 
consecutively in two, three and four years.  
Consistent with the investor divergence of opinion hypothesis, repurchasing firms have a 
higher degree of divergence of opinion compared to non-repurchasing firms. The difference in 
divergence of opinion remains significant after controlling for firm characteristics. The number 
of shares repurchased is positively correlated with the degree of divergence of opinion - firms 
with a higher divergence repurchase more shares during a year. The explanatory power of 
divergence of opinion remains significant after controlling for other explanations, including the 
book-to-market ratio, cash distribution, dividend substitution, and information asymmetry. 
Divergence of opinion drops significantly after managers actually repurchase shares. The results 
are consistent in repurchasing programs with one-, two- and three-consecutive years. 
Our results are also consistent with the agency cost hypothesis. Repurchasing firms have 
higher level of cash and free cash flow, profitability and intangible asset ratio, but lower stock 
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returns, and fixed assets ratio. We also document significant decreases in both cash and free cash 
flow after actual share repurchases. 
We do not find evidence to support the information asymmetry hypothesis. Our results 
indicate instead that firms with higher information asymmetry actually repurchase fewer shares, 
and we do not find a significant decrease in information asymmetry following actual share 
repurchase. These results are in contrast to the information hypothesis but in agreement with 
Miller and Rock (1985), who argue that managers are reluctant to repurchase shares when the 
information asymmetry is higher due to adverse selection.  
Our findings suggest that investors and researchers should exercise cautions in 
interpreting managers‘ announcement, especially when the announcement is not a commitment. 
We also argue that it is important to recognize the impact of investor heterogeneity, as suggested 
by Bagwell (1991), when the homogeneous representative model does not fit into the empirical 
observations. 
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